This study examines (1) whether network ties help explain variation in tax avoidance, and (2) how the relation between network ties and tax avoidance varies depending on the nature and context of those ties. We posit that information on a range of tax-avoidance strategies is shared among firms through their social network connections. Using board interlocks to proxy for these connections, we find that firms with greater board ties to low-tax firms have lower cash ETRs themselves. Ties to low-tax firms are more influential when the focal firm and its network partner are operationally and strategically similar, as are ties created by executive directors. Board ties to low-tax firms are also more influential when the focal firm and its network partner engage the same local auditor. Overall, our results suggest that the influence of firms' network ties on their tax-avoidance behavior depends on the character of those ties.

The term “audit style” is used to characterize the unique set of internal working rules of each Big 4 audit firm for the implementation of auditing standards and the enforcement of GAAP within their clienteles. Audit style implies that two companies audited by the same Big 4 auditor, subject to the same audit style, are more likely to have comparable earnings than two firms audited by two different Big 4 firms with different styles. By comparable we mean that two firms in the same industry and year will have a more similar accruals and earnings structure. For a sample of U.S. companies for the period 1987 to 2011, we find evidence consistent with audit style increasing the comparability of reported earnings within a Big 4 auditor's clientele. Data Availability: All data are publicly available from the sources identified in the text.

The SEC Advisory Committee on Smaller Public Companies recommends paid-for research to fill the void created by declining sell-side coverage. Potential conflicts of interest inherent in paid-for research challenge this recommendation. We evaluate whether paid-for research provides value to investors or merely reflects hype. Analyses of one- and two-year-ahead paid-for earnings forecasts fail to identify significant bias. Using a portfolio approach, favorable (unfavorable) paid-for recommendations yield positive (negative) stock returns at release, with upward (downward) drift over the following year. Regressing future stock returns on recommendations and valuation estimates using paid-for analysts' forecasts yields similar results. Further, results fail to indicate significant differences in paid-for and matched sell-side research. Overall, our evidence suggests that paid-for research provides relevant information for the buy-and-hold investor that is comparable to that of matched sell-side research, providing empirical support for the SEC Advisory Committee recommendation. JEL Classifications: G11; G14; G24. Data Availability: Data are publicly available from the sources identified in the text.