Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 130 requires companies to report comprehensive income in a primary financial statement, but allows its presentation in either a statement of comprehensive income or a statement of stockholders' equity (Financial Accounting Standards Board [FASB] 1997). In an experiment, we examine whether and how alternative presentation formats affect nonprofessional investors' processing of comprehensive-income information, specifically, information disclosing the volatility of unrealized gains on available-for-sale marketable securities. The results show that nonprofessional investors' judgments of corporate and management performance reflect the volatility of comprehensive income only when it is presented in a statement of comprehensive income. We provide evidence consistent with our psychology-based framework that these findings occur because format affects how nonprofessional investors weight comprehensive-income information and not whether they acquire this information or how they evaluate it.

[This study uses experiments to examine whether individuals' earnings forecasts correctly reflect the time series properties of quarterly earnings, in particular, the positive autocorrelation in seasonal quarterly changes and the negative fourth-order moving average term documented by Brown and Rozeff (1979). We find that individuals' forecasts are sensitive to the magnitude of these time series components; however, individuals typically underweight the moving average term and under- (over-)weight the most recent seasonal quarterly change when it has a strong (weak) effect on future earnings. Individuals also place slightly more weight on quarterly changes when earnings are reported relative to those four quarters prior. These results suggest that the documented stock market under-reaction to quarterly earnings may not hold universally; rather, it may be composed of under-reactions to firms with strong autocorrelation in seasonal changes and over-reactions to firms with weak autocorrelation in seasonal changes.]

Audit committees evaluate financial reporting quality as part of their corporate oversight responsibilities. Given this responsibility, the national stock exchanges now require all audit committee members to be financially literate and at least one member to have financial expertise. In light of recent debates over this requirement, we provide evidence on how experts and literates differ in their evaluations of financial reporting quality. Results suggest that experts' evaluations of financial reporting quality are more strongly associated with their assessments of characteristics underlying reporting quality (e.g., relevance) espoused in Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2's framework than literates' evaluations. Additionally, literates are more likely than experts to identify concerns about reporting treatments for business activities that are prominent in the business press or are distinguished by their nonrecurring nature, while experts are more likely to raise concerns about reporting treatments for less prominent, recurring activities. This same pattern occurs in the ratings of the quality of the reporting treatments for specific financial statement items with respect to elements underlying reporting quality (e.g., neutrality); literates (experts) assess the quality elements for the reporting treatments of prominent and nonrecurring items (less prominent and recurring items) comparatively lower than experts (literates). These results suggest that including financial experts on audit committees is likely to change the structure and focus of audit committee discussions about financial reporting quality, and may affect the committee's overall assessment of the quality of a company's financial reports.

A fundamental accounting question is whether investors perceive low risk when earnings are smooth relative to the volatility of operating cash flows. We conduct two experiments to examine this question. Absent additional information concerning the likelihood of earnings management, our first experiment finds that investors give managers the benefit of the doubt and perceive low risk when earnings are relatively smooth. Given this finding, our second experiment examines whether additional information that supports investors' suspicions of earnings management affects investors' risk judgments when earnings are relatively smooth. We find that investors no longer give managers the benefit of the doubt when additional information suggests that managers have either the opportunity or the incentive to report smooth earnings. Our study provides important insights to the literature concerning both “whether” and “when” relatively smooth earnings affect investors' risk judgments. Data Availability: Contact the authors.

Employment relationships provide fertile ground for both employee and employer opportunism. Employers worry about whether employees will devote sufficient effort to work, and employees are concerned about whether employers will compensate them appropriately. In this paper, we examine whether employer discretion over the size of the total employee compensation pool and the allocation of this pool among employees influences employee and employer opportunism. The results of our experiment indicate that firm output and employees' compensation are greater when the employer does not have discretion over total employee compensation, but does have discretion over the allocation of total compensation. We find that the employer's residual profit increases with discretion over the allocation of compensation among employees; however, we find no effect on residual profit of the employer's discretion over the total amount of employee compensation. Our results suggest that firms benefit from a compensation contract that establishes total employee compensation as a predetermined function of public, aggregate measures such as accounting income, but provides the employer at least some discretion to allocate this compensation using private information. However, our results caution that employees and employers may not have similar preferences for the degree of employer discretion over the determination of total employee compensation.

Business executives and academics frequently criticize budget-based compensation plans as providing incentives for subordinates to build slack into proposed budgets. In this paper, we examine whether either of two practices—using budgets to allocate scarce resources, or providing information about co-workers—reduces budget slack and increases subordinate performance when organizations use budgets for performance evaluation. The results from our experiment show that using budgets for both resource allocation and performance evaluation not only eliminates budget slack, but also increases subordinates' effort and task performance. Additionally, we find that an internal reporting system that provides information about subordinates' budgets and performance to their co-workers mitigates budget slack when superiors do not use budgets as a basis for resource allocation. These results highlight the synergies between the planning (resource allocation) and control (performance evaluation) functions of managerial accounting practices such as budgeting. Our results also suggest that by designing the internal information system to reduce information asymmetry among subordinates, the firm can increase subordinates' incentives to provide more accurate budgets.

XBRL (eXtensible Business Reporting Language) is an emerging technology that facilitates directed searches and simultaneous presentation of related financial statement and footnote information. We investigate whether using an XBRL-enhanced search engine helps nonprofessional financial statement users acquire and integrate related financial information when making an investment decision. We conduct our investigation in the context of recognition versus disclosure of stock option compensation. Our results reveal that many users do not access the technology, but those who do use it are better able to acquire and integrate information. Specifically, we find that when stock option accounting varies between firms, the use of an XBRL-enhanced search engine increases the likelihood that individuals acquire information about stock option compensation disclosed in the footnotes. We also find that XBRL helps individuals integrate the implications of this information, resulting in different investment decisions between individuals who use and do not use the search engine. Our results suggest that search-facilitating technologies, such as XBRL, aid financial statement users by improving the transparency of firms' financial statement information and managers' choices for reporting that information. Our results also reveal that wide publicity about the benefits of using search-facilitating technology may be needed to induce financial statement users to access the technology.