Examines earnings management in the health maintenance organization (HMO) sector of the prepaid health-care industry. HMO industry evolution and regulation; HMO management strategy in the accrual of incurred but not reported expenses (IBNRs); Discretionary and nondiscretionary components of IBNR to total expenses ratio.
[Although health-care reform has emerged recently as an important national priority, there has been little research on the effect of possible deficiencies in both accounting and auditing standards in the development of problems in this area. This study examines earnings management in the health maintenance organization (HMO) sector of the prepaid health-care industry. HMOs are a principal component of the managed health-care concept currently being promoted as important in controlling escalating health-care costs. The study examines possible strategic behavior by HMO management in the accrual of "incurred but not reported expenses" (IBNRs). IBNRs are the costs of medical care provided to HMO enrollees during a given year but not yet reported to the HMO by the fiscal year-end. They consist primarily of five components: accrued inpatient hospitalization costs, accrued primary physician costs, accrued costs from medical specialists to whom HMO enrollees have been referred, accrued medical incentive pool payments, and other miscellaneous medical costs. Their accrual was first recommended by the Health Maintenance Organization Task Force of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants in an issues paper later published as an exposure draft (AICPA 1985). It was eventually released as SOP 89-5 entitled Financial Accounting and Reporting by Providers of Prepaid Health Services in 1989 to be effective for fiscal years beginning on or after 15 June 1989 with earlier application encouraged. However, by the time SOP 89-5 was issued, a significant majority of HMOs was already in compliance with the SOP, at least so far as the accrual of IBNRs was concerned. The results of this study suggest that IBNRs may have been used as part of a strategic response by HMO management to events specific to the industry in the 1986-1989 period. These events included the outbreak of a premium war apparently waged to obtain market share at the expense of immediate profitability and the enactment in many states of minimum net worth regulations designed to prevent the resultant increase in financial failures among HMOs. The results suggest that the IBNRs were systematically understated by financially weaker HMOs (relative to their stronger counterparts) in order to minimize regulatory costs associated with the statutory minimum net worth requirements imposed by some states during this period. Furthermore, the results were also consistent with the political visibility hypothesis, which theorizes that highly profitable firms in politically sensitive sectors seek to reduce their visibility by adopting income-decreasing accounting methods and discretionary accruals. However, the findings were not consistent with the political visibility hypothesis if size is visualized as a proxy for political visibility.]
[Commercial bank loan portfolios are typically 10 to 15 times larger than bank equity; therefore bank loan portfolio cash flows and default risks are likely to have an important impact on bank stock market values. Bank financial statements provide three separate disclosures of changing default risks: non-performing loans, loan loss provisions, and loan chargeoffs. This study analyzes each of these disclosures for information about future bank cash flows and examines how investors impound this information in bank stock prices. Non-performing loans include all loans in the portfolio more than 90 days overdue on interest or principal payments, and are disclosed as supplemental financial statement information. Loan loss provisions reflect the current period increase in the level of expected future loan losses, and are disclosed as accrued expenses on the income statement. Loan chargeoffs measure all loans deemed uncollectible during the period. Chargeoffs are asset writeoffs that are reported separately in financial statement footnotes, and can also be derived from balance sheet and income statement data. Together these three disclosures represent an integrated, contextual set of potentially value-relevant information spanning the income statement, balance sheet, and footnotes. Recent empirical studies obtain evidence consistent with a positive relation between stock returns and loan loss provisions (cf., Beaver et al. 1989; Elliott et al. 1991; Griffin and Wallach 1991; Johnson 1989). This evidence is surprising because it contradicts the notion that loan loss provisions are interpreted as expenses that reflect expected future loan losses. These papers conjecture that perhaps the market interprets provisions as revelations of bank managers' private information about expected future earnings, but do not test this idea. One potential explanation for these findings is that investors condition their interpretation of unexpected provisions on contemporaneous unexpected changes in non-performing loans and unexpected loan chargeoffs. These relatively non-discretionary pieces of loan loss information may enable investors to estimate discretionary components in unexpected loan loss provisions. If investors observe discretion being exercised over reported provisions, then they can make inferences about managers' private information. The conjecture of prior research is that investors infer that managers reveal "good news" when they exercise discretion to increase provisions. The evidence presented here suggests bank managers increase the discretionary component of unexpected loan loss provisions when future cash flow prospects improve. Specifically, unexpected provisions are positively related to future changes in cash flows, after controlling for current changes in cash flows, unexpected changes in non-performing loans, and unexpected loan chargeoffs. Annual unexpected provisions are positively related to future changes in cash flows as far as three years ahead. Contemporaneous annual (and quarterly) stock returns, as well as earnings announcement date stock price reactions, confirm that investors interpret discretionary components of unexpected provisions as "good news." These findings contribute new evidence on earnings management and its impact on the capital markets. The positive relations between unexpected provisions and both returns and future cash flows emerge only when unexpected provisions are conditioned on unexpected changes in non-performing loans and unexpected loan chargeoffs. These results suggest unexpected changes in non-performing loans and unexpected loan chargeoffs, both of which are negatively related to changes in future cash flows and current stock returns, and enable investors to observe discretionary components of unexpected provisions. These findings provide new evidence of a context in which the market's interpretation of a component of income is conditioned on related disclosures found on the balance sheet and in the financial statement footnotes.]
[This article considers errors in databases commonly used by researchers. Specifically, the study investigates the manner in which the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) tapes adjusts prices for stock distributions, i.e., stock dividends and stock splits. All distributions reported by CRSP during the period January 1 through December 31, 1989 were reviewed for proper distribution code, record date, ex-dividend date, and distribution date by comparison to a secondary data source, Moody's Dividend Record (MDR). Additionally, the accuracy of the factor used by CRSP to adjust the price and number of shares outstanding for the stock distribution was verified by comparison to MDR. Completeness of CRSP reporting was tested by tracing all stock distributions reported by MDR back into the CRSP tapes. In all, 718 distributions were examined. All differences (142, or 20 percent of the distributions) were reconciled where possible (11 could not be resolved) by examination of the respective companies' annual reports. Coding differences (91, or 64 percent of the differences) arose because of CRSP policy of designating as stock dividends all distributions that are less than or equal to 20 percent of the then-existing shares while all others are stock splits. This coding policy may affect research that uses stock distributions to test signalling by management. The remaining 51 exceptions (36 percent) included 20 ex-date differences that were perceived to be of little consequence, and 31 dissimilarities (22 percent) that are considered significant. In 27 of these variances, CRSP was found to be in error, which ranged from 75 percent to 100 percent when compared to primary data sources. In a second phase, the 1990 CRSP tape was examined to follow-up the status of 44 errors observed in the data review of previous work by these authors utilizing 1981 and 1982 data and of errors detected in phase one of this study. The evidence demonstrates that some errors remain undetected for long periods of time. Finally, the degree to which errors may affect the statistical testing of volume variables showed no significant bias.]
Focuses on the errors in databases commonly used by researchers. Analysis of Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) shares-outstanding data for 1989; Trading volumes analyses in empirical research and studies; Errors in CRSP and COMPUSTAT tapes.
Analyzes three separate disclosures of changing default risks for information about future bank cash flows and examines how investors impound this information in bank stock prices. Impact of bank loan portfolio cash flows and default risks on bank stock market values; Commercial bank loan loss accounting; Set of cash flow prediction tests.
[Top executives' compensation contracts typically provide for annual incentive awards that link executives' cash compensation and reported earnings. This link has been confirmed empirically by Lambert and Larcker (1987), who document a positive association between the cash compensation of chief executive officers (CEOs) and their firms' contemporaneous earnings performance. The widespread use of earnings-based incentives has prompted concerns that executives may select real decisions and accounting procedures to maximize their earnings-based compensation, irrespective of the impact on the economic well-being of the firm (Kaplan and Atkinson 1989, 724; Watts and Zimmerman 1986, 204). These concerns presume that the earnings-based performance measures specified in compensation contracts are strictly adhered to in setting executive compensation. In practice, however, these plans are administered by compensation committees, who could adjust compensation to prevent executives from engaging in opportunistic behavior. Existing research provides mixed evidence as to whether compensation committees adjust earnings-based compensation. For example, Abdel-khalik (1985) finds evidence that CEO compensation is adjusted in response to accounting procedure changes. In contrast, Healy et al. (1987) find no evidence that CEO compensation is adjusted for the effects of accounting procedure changes on reported earnings. This study provides evidence suggesting that compensation committees do adjust earnings-based incentive compensation. It documents reliable and systematic evidence that CEOs' cash compensation is adjusted for restructuring charges. We investigate a sample of 182 restructuring charges taken by 91 Fortune 500 firms between 1982 and 1989. The short-term incentive plans of the sample firms do not include explicit provisions for restructuring charges to be excluded from the definition of earnings used to determine executives' incentive compensation. The empirical analysis, however, indicates that CEO cash compensation is shielded from restructuring charges relative to other components of earnings. The results also suggest that the degree to which executive compensation is adjusted for a restructuring charge depends on the characteristics of the restructuring. Our evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that compensation committees systematically override the provisions of incentive plans to avoid providing executives with incentives to behave opportunistically. Restructurings typically require a large charge to earnings but can have a positive impact on the economic well-being of a firm. By adjusting executive compensation for restructuring charges, the compensation committee ensures that executives are not deterred from undertaking value-enhancing restructurings.]
[Often overlooked in empirical analyses of the relation between audit quality and audit fees is the recognition that they are mutually determined by the interaction of the client's demand for, and the audit firm's supply of, audit quality. Failure to account for this endogeneity can lead to biased inferences concerning the audit quality/audit fee relation. We adopt a simultaneous equations estimation procedure (offered by Amemiya 1978) applicable to jointly determined endogenous variables when one of the variables (in our case the quality review outcome) is qualitative in nature.1 To illustrate the procedure, we use a dataset developed by the United States General Accounting Office (GAO 1987) in its study of the audit procurement practices of entities receiving federal financial assistance. Inferences using this procedure differ from those of single-stage analyses. The results suggest that within the context of the application examined, audit fees appear to be positively related to the supply of audit quality and inversely related to the demand for audit quality. These findings have implication for studies involving audit fees and studies examining the demand characteristics of auditing.]
Suggests that compensation committees adjust earnings-based executive incentive compensation. Annual executive incentive awards background; Hypotheses on the impact of restructuring charges on executives' annual incentive compensation; Description of sample selection and variable measurement.