This study investigates the influence of analyst forecast dispersion on Ohlson's (2001) proposed linear information dynamics where consensus analyst forecasts are suggested as a proxy for other information. Our results indicate that Ohlson's proposed valuation model is most descriptive of market pricing when forecast dispersion, and hence information asymmetry, is high. Our results also suggest that when analysts are confronted with high information asymmetry, they tend to focus less on accounting fundamentals and rely more on other nonaccounting information, thus decreasing the correlation between the explanatory power of analyst forecasts and that of earnings and book value.

Scholes et al. (2005) predict that S corporations, and other conduit entities such as partnerships and LLCs, can sell for a tax-driven purchase price premium relative to C corporations. We test this conjecture by comparing purchase price multiples in a sample of taxable stock acquisitions of S corporations to purchase price multiples for a matched set of taxable stock acquisitions of privately held C corporations. Consistent with Scholes et al.'s (2005) predictions, we find evidence that the organizational form of the target influences acquisition tax structure and acquisition price. Specifically, the evidence supports the conclusion that conduit entities (S corporations) fetch a taxbased purchase price premium relative to similar C corporations. Furthermore, our estimates indicate that average tax benefits in S corporation acquisitions are equal to approximately 12–17 percent of deal value.

The binary classification of firms into profits or losses represents a powerful heuristic. The literature that has examined the impact on the firm of this earnings heuristic has focused on the earnings management actions of small profit firms. The impact of this earnings heuristic on the actions of firms reporting accounting losses and the decision-making effects the heuristic may have other than earnings management have not been examined. In this study we hypothesize that reporting an accounting loss acts as a heuristic trigger for firms to exercise the abandonment option and discard unproductive investments. The results are consistent with the hypothesis. We find that there is a sharp and economically significant discontinuity around zero in the level of investment in labor between small profit and small loss firms. The discontinuity is due to loss firms having a lower-than-expected level of investment in labor, given their economic fundamentals. Further tests show that this discontinuity is due to the exercise of the abandonment option. We find that firms switching from a profit to a loss cut labor to a greater extent than other firms with similar changes in earnings that do not pass the loss threshold. Taken together the results are consistent with the accounting loss heuristic acting as a major disciplinary or incentive altering event that resolves agency problems.