Prior research demonstrates that investors respond differently to earnings surprises that are part of a string of consecutive earnings increases or surprises than to those that are not. To shed light on who values these patterns, I compare trading responses of small and large traders to earnings surprises that occur during a series of positive or negative surprises. I find that the relative intensity of small traders' trading response (and, to a lesser extent, that of medium traders) to earnings surprises generally increases as a series progresses. Small traders respond more negatively to the second (third) negative surprise in a series than to the first (second), and more positively for the first three surprises in a positive series. Moreover, I find that announcement-period returns are related to the trading of small and medium traders. These results suggest that less sophisticated smaller traders, responding to earnings series, contribute to previously documented pricing patterns. Data Availability: All data used in this study, with the exception of data obtained from an anonymous discount brokerage firm, are publicly available from the sources indicated in the text.

Evidence evaluation in accounting often involves both the assessment of evidence relevance and the combination of its relevance and source to assess overall strength. We decompose this strength-assessment judgment into its components—relevance assessment and source and relevance combination—and consider the effects of experience. Participants in our experiment assess the strength and relevance of tax authorities in relation to a client scenario. Contrary to prior research, we find that more-experienced participants exhibit greater use of analogical reasoning when evaluating tax-authority relevance than do less-experienced participants. We find a similar experience effect in the use of configural information processing to combine authority source and relevance, a judgment not previously considered in tax. The effects of experience are particularly important in the current environment as the tax function is a leading cause of material weaknesses and restatements under Sarbanes-Oxley and tax executives cite increasing difficulty in hiring and retaining qualified professionals. Data Availability: Data are available from the authors on request.

We examine whether audit quality affects the trade-off between accrual-based and real earnings management. We hypothesize that firms motivated to manage earnings per share (EPS) to meet or beat consensus analysts' forecasts are more likely to engage in accretive stock repurchases (a form of real earnings management) when their ability to manage earnings through accruals is constrained by high audit quality. We find that firms with high audit quality are more likely to use accretive stock repurchases and less likely to use accrual-based earnings management to meet or beat consensus analysts' forecasts. Our results are robust to various controls for endogeneity concerns.

We investigate analysts' motives for rounding annual EPS forecasts (placing a zero or five in the penny location of the forecast). We first show that an intuitive reason for analysts to engage in rounding is in circumstances where the penny digit of the forecast is of less economic significance. By rounding, analysts reveal that their forecasts are not intended to be precise to the penny. We also show that analyst incentives impact the likelihood of rounding. Specifically, we predict that analysts will exert less effort forecasting earnings for firms that generate less brokerage or investment banking business since such firms create less value for the analysts' employers. As a consequence of this reduced effort and attention, the analyst will be more uncertain about the penny digit of the forecast and so will round. Our results are consistent with this prediction. One implication of our findings is that a rounded forecast is a simple and easily observable proxy for a more noisy measure of the market's expectation of earnings. Consistent with this implication, we show that rounded forecasts bias down earnings response coefficients at earnings announcements.

This study investigates how manager and auditor incentives, along with audit committee characteristics, are associated with materiality judgments about detected misstatements. Using data on detected misstatements that occurred between 2003 and 2006, we find auditors' incentives to protect their reputations weaken the effect of managerial incentives associated with the pressure created by analyst following; auditors are less likely to allow managers to waive material misstatements as audit fees increase. Regarding audit committee characteristics, results reveal that audit committees with greater financial expertise are less likely to allow managers to waive material misstatements compared to audit committees with less expertise. Data Availability: Data used in the study are available from public sources.

This study examines the effect that two key balanced scorecard (BSC) framework elements—causal linkages between strategic objectives in the strategy map and performance measures categorized by scorecard perspective—have on managers' ability to interpret the strategic relevance of external information and use this information to evaluate the appropriateness of an organization's strategy. We conduct two experiments, finding that presenting a set of strategic objectives as a strategy map enhances both managers' information relevance and strategy appropriateness judgments. We attribute this improvement to the explication of causal linkages between objectives in a strategy map. In contrast, presenting performance measures categorized by scorecard perspective only improves managers' strategy appropriateness judgments when the managers are provided with a set of strategic objectives that are not presented in a strategy map structure. Our study contributes to the literature by demonstrating that these two elements of the BSC framework have differential decision-facilitating impacts on managers' strategic judgments. Data Availability: Data are available from the authors upon request.

Burgstahler et al. (2002) investigate the implications of special items for future earnings and report that firms use negative special items to accelerate the recognition of future expenses into the current period. That is, negative special items serve as an “inter-period transfer” device. We extend their analysis and find that earnings increase in post-special item quarters beyond the four quarters considered in Burgstahler et al. (2002). In particular, we find that future earnings increase over the subsequent 16 quarters by more than 130 percent of the reported negative special item. The earnings increases are greater for restructuring charges than for asset write-downs or goodwill impairment charges. Such patterns suggest that negative special items also signal real future performance improvements (i.e., performance improvement hypothesis) in addition to inter-period expense transfer (i.e., inter-period transfer hypothesis). Moreover, the real improvement effect appears to be driven by restructuring charges, the most prevalent type of special item.

This study examines whether the adoption in 2003 of FASB Interpretation No. 46/R (FIN 46), Consolidation of Variable Interest Entities—An Interpretation of ARB No. 51, changed the cost of capital for affected firms. Using comparative analysis on a broad sample of 11,719 firm-quarter observations for 1,389 firms during the period 1998 through 2005, we find evidence that FIN 46 significantly increased the cost of equity capital for firms with affected variable interest entities (VIEs), an increase of approximately 50 basis points relative to firms reporting no material effect from the standard. Further, firms consolidating these formerly off-balance sheet structures experienced the largest increase. Taken together, these results suggest that FIN 46 reduced the opportunity for firms to use off-balance sheet structures to artificially reduce their cost of capital, a matter of regulatory concern. Data Availability: All data are available from public sources.

Press releases accompanying earnings restatements attempt to minimize negative reactions by explaining the reasons for the restatement. Although text-based press releases have been the norm for years, firms have recently begun using online video for such announcements. We examine the implications of doing so, and find that when a CEO accepts responsibility by making an internal attribution for a restatement, investors viewing the announcement online via video recommend larger investments in the firm than do investors viewing the announcement online via text. In contrast, when the CEO denies responsibility by making an external attribution for the restatement, investors viewing the announcement online via video recommend smaller investments in the firm than do investors viewing the announcement online via text. Our results also reveal that investor trust mediates the effect of disclosure venue and attribution on investment recommendations. These findings are important given the economic significance and trust-damaging implications of restatements, as well as the increased use of online video to make important announcements. Data Availability: Contact the authors for data and video.

Relevance and reliability (now referred to as “representational faithfulness”) are qualities of financial information that both the Financial Accounting Standards Board and the International Accounting Standards Board use in setting standards for financial reporting. Despite their importance, very little research has addressed how financial statement users apply these constructs. Via experiments set within the fair value context, we show that users do not view them as independent constructs. Instead, variations in properties that are associated with the reliability of a measurement influence users' assessments of the relevance of fair value. The relationship between assessed relevance and assessed reliability is unidirectional, in that factors underlying reliability influence judgments of relevance, but factors underlying relevance do not influence judgments of reliability. Our findings are important because inappropriate assessments of relevance can influence firm valuation. The results are particularly meaningful in the context of fair value because such measurements can vary widely in reliability.