This study examines whether managers alter their financial reporting decisions in the face of investment-related pressure. We define investment-related pressure as the increased pressure managers feel to retain their job following an M&A poorly received by the market. We hypothesize that managers attempt to assuage pressure by delivering strong performance post-merger, creating incentives for misreporting. Our findings indicate that acquirers with more negative M&A announcement returns are more likely to misstate financial statements in the post-investment period and the issuance of misstated financials mitigates this pressure, at least in the near term. Our study contributes to the literature on the relation between corporate investing and financial reporting by showing how investment-related pressure leads to misreporting, even in a setting where the costs (e.g., greater probability of detection) are high. Our study also has implications for the large body of research that evaluates various consequences of M&As using post-merger performance. Specifically, researchers should be careful to distinguish real from misstated financial performance in the post-investment period. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources indicated in the text.

Corporate investment decisions require managers to forecast expected future cash flows from potential investments. Although these forecasts are a critical component of successful investing, they are not directly observable by external stakeholders. In this study, we investigate whether the quality of managers' externally reported earnings forecasts can be used to infer the quality of their corporate investment decisions. Relying on the intuition that managers draw on similar skills when generating external earnings forecasts and internal payoff forecasts for their investment decisions, we predict that managers with higher quality external earnings forecasts make better investment decisions. Consistent with our prediction, we find that forecasting quality is positively associated with the quality of both acquisition and capital expenditure decisions. Our evidence suggests that externally observed forecasting quality can be used to infer the quality of capital budgeting decisions within firms.

We investigate the role played by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in monitoring fair value disclosures in regulatory filings. Specifically, we assess whether SEC action via the issuance of fair value comment letters to registrants is followed by reductions in uncertainty about the firms' fair value estimates. We hypothesize that registrants that receive a comment letter focusing on their fair value disclosure policies experience reductions in investor uncertainty regarding their fair value estimates in the post-letter period, compared to the pre-letter period. Supporting this prediction, we find that for the periods after the fair value comment letters, the associations between Level 2 and 3 fair value assets and our measures of uncertainty are significantly reduced. These findings are robust to a series of tests designed to ensure that we do not simply capture general changes in market uncertainty levels for firms investing in these types of assets. Our study contributes to the further understanding of market participants' perception of fair value disclosures by investigating the role of SEC enforcement. This finding is important given recent criticisms of fair value reporting emanating from the highest levels of government and industry. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources identified in the paper.

In this study, we examine some of the consequences of asset securitization. Specifically, using a sample of bank holding companies, we investigate whether the difficulty in assessing the true extent of risk transfer, between securitizing banks and investors in asset-backed securities, affects bank information uncertainty. We find that when market participants have a greater difficulty in estimating risk transfer, banks face greater information uncertainty (i.e., larger bid-ask spreads and analyst forecast dispersion). In addition, we find that this effect is mitigated for banks that operate in a higher quality information environment. We also find that banks that securitize financial assets have higher spreads and analyst forecast dispersion as compared to non-securitizing banks.

This study investigates how differences between the rating agencies' initial (at the date of debt issuance) and subsequent (post-issuance) monitoring incentives affect securitizing banks' rating accuracy. We hypothesize that the agencies have stronger incentives to monitor issuers when providing initial versus post-issuance ratings. We document that initial ratings are positively associated with off-balance sheet securitized assets and incrementally associated with on-balance sheet retained securities. However, subsequent ratings fail to capture current exposure to off-balance sheet securitizations. We also find that subsequent ratings reflect default risk less accurately than initial ratings. The subsequent ratings' responsiveness to default risk is worse when a bank has more off-balance sheet securitized assets. Collectively, our findings are consistent with lax post-issuance monitoring. They raise questions about the effectiveness of using ratings as an ongoing contracting mechanism and suggest that conclusions about rating accuracy could differ depending on whether researchers focus on initial versus post-issuance ratings.

This study investigates whether and when differences in the credit rating agencies' methodologies result in differences in rating properties. In particular, this study focuses on differences in information processing constraints between a rating agency that utilizes qualitative analysis and direct access to borrowers' management in its rating process (Standard & Poor's) compared to one that does not (Egan Jones Ratings Company) and how these differences affect rating quality. We find that as information uncertainty about borrowers increases, Egan Jones's rating accuracy, informativeness, and timeliness decrease relative to Standard & Poor's. Our findings suggest that Egan Jones's more restricted rating methodology can lead to limitations in information processing and, thus, reductions in Egan Jones's rating quality advantage for borrowers with greater information uncertainty.

We study firms’ decisions to withhold loan covenant details by focusing on a unique disclosure-related cost. Prior research documents the prevalence of tight initial covenants that are selectively relaxed in future renegotiations. This uncertainty in renegotiation outcomes can generate a disclosure-related cost because disclosing a snapshot of initial covenants with a high likelihood of violation could lead to harmful outsider reactions (e.g., trade credit cuts) to violations that may be eventually cured. We hypothesize and find that, when firms are likely to face tighter initial covenants and more renegotiations, they are more likely to withhold covenant details, particularly when under pressure from trade creditors. Our inference is robust to controlling for firms’ obligation to disclose (i.e., contract materiality) and future performance. Prior research has found that the precise covenant details of many loans are not publicly available. We are the first to offer a systematic explanation related to disclosure costs.