Examines the empirical association between trading volume and belief revisions that differ among individual analysts. Hypothesis based on relative positions of individual analysts' current and prior forecasts of earnings to measure differential belief revisions.
[This study examines the association between trading volume and belief revisions. Most trading volume theories suggest that investors' differential belief revisions cause trading volume. A belief revision is differential if it changes the position of an individual's expectation relative to the distribution of expectations held by others. Thus, I use the correlation between the relative positions of individual analysts' current and prior forecasts of earnings to measure differential belief revisions. In a multiple regression analysis, this correlation measure explains trading volume beyond that explained by prior dispersion in forecasts, which is consistent with Karpoff's (1986) prediction that trading is caused by both differential prior beliefs and differential belief revisions.]
This paper examines the ex ante effects of public information quality on market prices and how such effects vary with information asymmetry among traders in a two-period experimental market. We vary public information quality by changing its precision and information asymmetry among traders by varying the distribution of private signals. We find high-quality public disclosure leads to increased price efficiency and decreased cost of capital in the pre-announcement period when information asymmetry is high. The impending high-quality public information increases the competition among informed traders, which leads prices to impound more private information and alleviates the adverse selection problems facing uninformed traders. Our study suggests building a high-quality public information environment (e.g., by adopting high-quality accounting standards or committing to transparent disclosure policies) would likely provide ex ante benefits for firms with significant adverse selection among traders.
[This paper investigates the association between aspects of investors' disagreement around earnings announcements and investors' trading decisions. Theory suggests that trading volume arises because of investor disagreement, but disagreement is a multi-faceted construct. We find that three distinctly different aspects of disagreement each play an incremental role in explaining trading volume around earnings announcements, even after controlling for the magnitude of the contemporaneous price change. These aspects of disagreement are: dispersion in prior beliefs, change in dispersion, and belief jumbling. Dispersion in prior beliefs is the level of variation in expectations before the earnings announcement, change in dispersion is the difference in the level of dispersion in beliefs after vs. before the earnings announcement, and belief jumbling occurs when investors' beliefs change positions relative to each other around the earnings announcement. Our results indicate that each of these three aspects of disagreement is associated with investors' real economic (i.e., trading) decisions around earnings announcements.]
In this study we examine changes in the precision and the commonality of information contained in individual analysts' earnings forecasts, focusing on changes around earnings announcements. Using the empirical proxies suggested by the Barron et al. (1998) model that are based on the across-analyst correlation in forecast errors, we conclude that the commonality of information among active analysts decreases around earnings announcements. We also conclude that the idiosyncratic information contained in these individual analysts' forecasts increases immediately after earnings announcements, and that this increase is more significant as more analysts revise their forecasts. These results are consistent with theories positing that an important role of accounting disclosures is to trigger the generation of idiosyncratic information by elite information processors such as financial analysts (Kim and Verrecchia 1994, 1997).
[This paper presents a model that relates properties of the analysts' information environment to the properties of their forecasts. First, we express forecast dispersion and error in the mean forecast in terms of analyst uncertainty and consensus (that is, the degree to which analysts share a common belief). Second, we reverse the relations to show how uncertainty and consensus can be measured by combining forecast dispersion, error in the mean forecast, and the number of forecasts. Third, we show that the quality of common and private information available to analysts can be measured using these same observable variables. The relations we present are intuitive and easily applied in empirical studies.]
Large earnings surprises and negative earnings surprises represent more egregious errors in analysts' earnings forecasts. We find evidence consistent with our expectation that egregious forecast errors motivate analysts to work harder to develop or acquire relatively more private information in an effort to avoid future forecasting failures. Specifically, we find that after large or negative earnings surprises there is a greater reduction in the error in individual analysts' forecasts of future earnings, and these individual forecasts are based more heavily on individual analysts' private information. This increased reliance on private information reduces the error in the mean forecast of upcoming earnings (even after controlling for the effect of reduced error in individual forecasts). As reliance on private information increases, more of each individual forecast error is idiosyncratic, and thus averaged out in the computation of the mean forecast.
Holthausen and Verrecchia's (1990) and Kim and Verrecchia's (1997) theoretical models predict that private information inferred at the time of an earnings announcement (private event-period information) is associated with greater trading volume. We provide empirical evidence consistent with these theories. Specifically, announcements that increase analysts' private information (as measured by Barron et al.'s [1998] empirical proxies) are associated with increased trading volume, consistent with some investors similarly acquiring private event-period information. In addition, announcements that decrease analysts' consensus are associated with more trading volume. Because consensus declines when private information increases, this finding provides reinforcing evidence that investors trade following earnings announcements because of private information that becomes useful only in conjunction with the information in the announcement and that this information is important enough to spur trading.
The Accounting Review199873(4), 421-433open access
This paper presents a model that relates properties of the analysts' information environment of the properties of their forecasts. First, we express forecast dispersion and error in the mean forecast in terms of analyst uncertainty and consensus (that is, the degree to which analysts share a common belief). Second, were reserve the relations to show how uncertainability and consensus cab be measured by combining forecast dispersion, error in the mean forecast, and the number of forecasts. Third, we show that the quality of common and private information available to analysts can be measured using these same observable variables. The relations we present are intuitive and easily applied in empirical studies.