Regulatory economics suggests that one benefit of public enforcement is the deterrence of improper conduct. Using a difference-in-differences (DiD) design, we investigate whether a deterrence effect follows the revelation of Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) enforcement. We find that large audit firm offices improve audit quality following enforcement naming another office within their firm while small firm offices improve following enforcement of local small firm competitors, with these responses varying by enforcement type. To understand potential mechanisms for the geographic deterrence effect, we examine the first occurrence of a revoked PCAOB registration within a market and find that results are stronger if there is greater news coverage or if nonsanctioned firms are in closer proximity to the sanctioned auditor. Supplemental tests reveal that results are stronger when nonsanctioned auditor clients are similar to the sanctioned firm’s clientele. Our findings suggest a positive but varied deterrence effect following PCAOB enforcement.

We use audit firm data breaches as time-varying, reputation-harming events to examine the value of auditor reputation—independent of actual audit quality—in the IPO process. We find that auditor data breaches are negatively associated with IPO offer price revisions. We demonstrate that this effect is due to an increase in institutional investors’ perception of information risk. Specifically, the effect is mitigated when other parties involved in the IPO reduce information risk themselves and when institutional investors are less likely to rely on audited financial information. In additional tests, we find that the impact of breaches on IPO offer price revisions is concentrated in breaches with greater severity, saliency, and frequency, consistent with institutional investors reacting to the announcement of the data breach rather than some other confounding factor. Collectively, our evidence suggests that IPO investors perceive time-varying reputational value of the external auditor, independent of changes in audit quality.

Because internal control audits never existed before the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), and these audits simultaneously became mandatory for all U.S. accelerated filer companies, it has been difficult to assess the extent of investor demand for these audits. To understand whether investors demand internal control audits for these large companies, we exploit a regulatory exemption that permits companies to exclude acquired operations from an internal control audit. Using this voluntary setting, we find that investors react negatively if a company excludes acquired operations from their internal control audit. This negative reaction is larger when more of the company's operations are excluded from audit and when there is greater information uncertainty. Further, companies that exclude acquired operations from internal control audits are more likely to have a subsequent restatement. Collectively, these findings are consistent with investors perceiving value in (i.e., demanding) internal control audits for large U.S. public companies.

We investigate the role of accounting and audit quality in the allocation of international development aid loans provided by the World Bank. This aid is crucial to improve governance functions, infrastructure, and capital markets, and the accounting and audit environments in a country can provide the World Bank with confidence that aid is being used as intended rather than being diverted for personal or political gain. We find that development aid loans are higher for countries with stronger accounting quality, where IFRS use is mandated, and where the audit environment is stronger. However, we also find that United States geo-political interests influence these results. Specifically, the World Bank appears to “overlook” accounting and audit quality in countries where geo-political interests are relatively aligned with those of the U.S. Finally, we find that accounting and auditing matter only in countries with relatively high corruption levels, indicating that the World Bank has greater trust that accounting and auditing are of relatively high quality in low-corruption countries. Data Availability: All data are publicly available.

This study examines the relation between auditors and their clients' investment efficiency. We hypothesize and find that auditor characteristics that proxy for an auditor's knowledge and resources are associated with higher client investment efficiency, after controlling for the auditor's effect on financial reporting quality. This result is consistent with auditors providing informational advantages to their clients in a generalized investment setting. We find that this auditor effect is more pronounced for clients who have a higher demand for information as measured by client size, industry competition, and client complexity. The effect is also more pronounced for clients of longer-tenured auditors. Overall, the results suggest that auditors may be one component to the management information environment and, as such, appear to influence capital investment behavior. JEL Classifications: M4; M42. Data Availability: All data are publicly available.