We develop a model to evaluate the costs and benefits of disclosing information about audit quality. Specifically, we examine whether audit quality disclosure affects auditors' effort and investors' investment efficiency. In our setting, an auditor exerts unobservable effort to influence audit quality and is motivated by liability in the event of audit failure. The usefulness of audited financial reports for investors depends on both the quality of the underlying financial reporting (e.g., as embodied by GAAP) and the quality of auditors' reports (i.e., the likelihood with which audit evidence uncovers managerial misreporting). We show that audit quality disclosure increases auditors' effort incentives if and only if the underlying financial reporting quality is relatively weak. We also show that such disclosure can actually reduce investment efficiency. Our analyses contribute to the debate about policies aimed at improving audit transparency.

We develop and validate an empirical measure of the informativeness of accounting assets in measuring firm-specific economic capital, an important determinant of both cash flows and intrinsic values. Our validation tests show that the asset informativeness measure is sensitive to differences in both accounting methods and implementation decisions at the firm level and corresponds to the way equity investors use the information in accounting assets. We find that accounting assets contain substantial information about firms' productive capacity (economic capital) and the information is not summarized in several earnings attributes often associated with earnings quality.