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CAPITAL AND REVENUE PROFITS AND LOSSES.

The Accounting Review 1932 7(3), 153-168
The article presents information about capital and revenue profits and losses. A profit is an increase in value. It may result through the sale of an asset, in which case the asset is replaced by cash, or an obligation to pay cash, of a greater value. A profit may also arise through an increase in the value of an asset itself, when viewed from a certain standpoint. The asset is not sold, but is simply regarded as being more valuable. In this case it is an unrealized profit, not being represented by cash in any way. There is one asset which obviously must be excepted from this rule, and that is cash itself. If a concern has cash abroad, a change in a rate of exchange can make a very real and immediate profit or loss. Profits and Losses are divided into those of Revenue, and those of Capital. Revenue profits and losses arise out of regular operations of the concern, which will be buying, manufacturing, and selling its products, or simply buying and selling merchandise of some kind. Capital profits and losses arise out of a transaction in a capital asset or liability, and accordingly one outside of the regular operations of the company.

Auditor Changes: A Joint Test of Theories Relating to Agency Costs and Auditor Differentiation

The Accounting Review 1988 63(4), 663-682
[This study tests whether there is a positive association between a firm's agency costs and its demand for a quality-differentiated audit. Audit firm quality is represented in two ways: a continuous size model in which a direct association is posited between auditor size (measured by clients' sales) and audit quality, and a "brand name" model in which the Big Eight group of auditors is defined as higher quality suppliers. The tests are supportive of the brand name model of audit quality: agency cost proxies are significant as a group, after controlling for client size and growth, only in the brand name model. The results are also supportive (albeit weakly in some instances) of the following individual agency-related incentives for higher quality audits: monitoring of incentive performance contracts, diffusion of ownership, owner-debtholder conflict, and the subsequent issue of public securities after the auditor change. However, the explanatory power of the models tested is low, after controlling for client size and growth.]