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Accounting Scholarship: What Is Uniquely Ours?

The Accounting Review 2001 76(2), 275-284
Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Search Site Cite View This Citation Add to Citation Manager Citation William R. Kinney; Accounting Scholarship: What Is Uniquely Ours?. The Accounting Review 1 April 2001; 76 (2): 275–284. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr.2001.76.2.275 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentThe Accounting Review Search Advanced Search

The Effect of Missing a Quarterly Earnings Benchmark on the CEO's Annual Bonus

The Accounting Review 2001 76(3), 313-332
We investigate the effects of missing quarterly earnings benchmarks on the CEO's annual bonus. After controlling for the general pay-for-performance relation, we find a significant incremental adverse effect on CEO annual cash bonuses when the firm's quarterly earnings fall short of the consensus analyst forecast or the earnings for the same quarter of the prior year, for at least two quarters during the year. However, we find that the relation between the bonus and the number of loss quarters is not significant. Our results suggest that CEO bonus payments provide CEOs with economic incentives to meet quarterly analyst earnings forecasts and earnings from the same quarter of the prior year.

The Effects of Domain Experience and Task Presentation Format on Accountants' Information Relevance Assurance

The Accounting Review 2001 76(3), 405-429
Information relevance advisory services offer growth opportunities for accountants in CPA firms, but we know little about the types of knowledge needed to provide high-quality advice. In a two-stage experiment, accountants with different management and public accounting experiences (that we suggest lead to different types of knowledge) receive task information in alternative formats, and develop relevant information for a client's decision. We find that participants are more likely to choose an appropriate problem representation when they receive an appropriate task format or when they have more management or public accounting experience (stage one). Also, when participants choose an appropriate problem representation, more management accounting experience improves their development of relevant information, but more public accounting experience does not (stage two). Our results suggest that tailored task presentation and domain experience that facilitates acquisition of multiple knowledge types improve accountants' information relevance advice.

Earnings Dilution and the Explanatory Power of Earnings for Returns

The Accounting Review 2001 76(4), 589-612
Executive stock options and convertible securities can increase the number of common shares outstanding while adding less than the market value of the newly issued securities to a firm's assets. We model the effect of expected dilution on the earnings/return relation. Expected dilution effectively reduces the permanence of an earnings innovation. Empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that dilutive securities attenuate the relation between earnings and returns. Estimated earnings response coefficients (ERCs) are significantly lower when there are shares reserved for conversion. The effect is more pronounced for firms that have experienced price increases or positive earnings news, as these increase the expected dilutive effect of conversions.

Honesty in Managerial Reporting

The Accounting Review 2001 76(4), 537-559
This study reports the results of three experiments that examine how preferences for wealth and honesty affect managerial reporting. We find that subjects often sacrifice wealth to make honest or partially honest reports, and they generally do not lie more as the payoff to lying increases. We also find less honesty under a contract that provides a smaller share of the total surplus to the manager than under one that provides a larger share, suggesting that the extent of honesty may depend on how the surplus is divided between the manager and the firm. The optimal agency contract yields more firm profit than a contract that relies exclusively on honest reporting. However, a modified version of the optimal agency contract, which makes use of subjects' preferences for honest reporting, yields the highest firm profit. These results suggest that firms may be able to design more profitable employment contracts than those identified by conventional economic analysis.