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Discretionary Revenues as a Measure of Earnings Management

The Accounting Review 2010 85(2), 695-717
This study examines the ability of revenue and accrual models to detect simulated and actual earnings management. The results indicate that revenue models are less biased, better specified, and more powerful than commonly used accrual models. Using a simulation procedure, I find that revenue models are more likely than accrual models to detect a combination of revenue and expense manipulation. Using a sample of firms subject to SEC enforcement actions for a mix of revenue- and expense-related misstatements, I find that, although revenue models detect manipulation, accrual models do not. These findings provide support for using measures of discretionary revenues to study earnings management.

Interpreting Economic and Social Data: A Foundation of Descriptive Statistics

The Accounting Review 2010 85(5), 1820-1822 open access
Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Search Site Cite View This Citation Add to Citation Manager Citation OTHMAR W. WINKLER, THOMAS R. DYCKMAN; Interpreting Economic and Social Data: A Foundation of Descriptive Statistics. The Accounting Review 1 September 2010; 85 (5): 1820–1822. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr.2010.85.5.1820 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentThe Accounting Review Search Advanced Search

Comprehensive Income: Who's Afraid of Performance Reporting?

The Accounting Review 2010 85(1), 97-126
Firms can report comprehensive income in either an income-statement-like performance statement or the statement of equity. Traditional theories of contracting incentives cannot explain this reporting location choice that only affects where comprehensive income data appear, because the contractible values of net income, other comprehensive income items, and comprehensive income are exactly the same regardless of the location where the firm reports comprehensive income. Drawing on theory, analysis of comment letters, and results of survey-based and behavioral research, we identify two factors—equity-based incentives and concerns over job security—that help explain why most firms do not follow policymakers' preference to report comprehensive income in a performance statement. Our empirical evidence on a broad cross-section of firms shows that managers with stronger equity-based incentives and less job security are significantly less likely to use performance reporting. Overall, our study suggests that even though the reporting location choice is inconsequential in a traditional rational markets view, managers act as if they believe that comprehensive income reporting location matters.

Performance Measurement of Corporate Tax Departments

The Accounting Review 2010 85(3), 1035-1064 open access
We investigate why firms choose to evaluate a tax department as a profit center (“contributor to the bottom line”) as opposed to as a cost center and the association between this choice and effective tax rates (ETRs). Using data from a confidential survey taken in 1999 of Chief Financial Officers, we develop and test a theory for choosing between these two methods of evaluating a tax department. We find that the likelihood of evaluating the tax department as a profit center is increasing in firm decentralization characteristics and tax-planning opportunities. We then employ instrumental variables to investigate whether evaluating a tax department as a profit center provides an effective incentive for the tax department to contribute to net income through lower ETRs. We find that our instrument for profit center firms is associated with significantly lower ETRs than cost center firms.