To minimize costs related to unfavorable perceptions of their tax-related activities, firms with low effective tax rates (ETR) could avoid, where possible, explicit mentions of their effective tax rates. Using this reputational cost perspective, we study an item of required disclosure in the income tax footnote of the 10-K, the ETR reconciliation table, where firms can choose a presentation format that reveals the tax rate (the percentage format) or one that avoids explicit mention of the effective tax rate (the dollar format). We find that firms with low ETRs are 24 percent more likely to use the dollar format and are also less likely to mention their tax rates elsewhere in their disclosures, consistent with the choice of dollar format reflecting a firm's overall tax disclosure strategy. Analysts' tax expense forecasts are less accurate for dollar format firms, suggesting higher processing costs associated with tax-related disclosures for these firms.

We examine changes in CEOs' disclosure styles in quarterly earnings conference calls over their tenure. Our longitudinal analysis of newly hired CEOs shows that CEOs' forward-looking disclosures and their disclosures' relative optimism decline in their tenure. Further, externally hired and inexperienced CEOs are more future-oriented, and younger CEOs exhibit greater optimism in their disclosures. We also find that non-CEO executives' disclosure styles remain time-invariant over their CEOs' tenure. Our evidence is consistent with uncertainty reduction about managers' ability over their tenure (1) reducing the demand for and the supply of forward-looking disclosures, and (2) attenuating managerial career concerns leading to the decline in disclosure optimism.

We study the information content and determinants associated with voluntary management disclosures of going concern (GC) uncertainties by IPO issuers. In terms of information content, we examine IPO price revision and initial return and find robust support that management GC disclosures are associated with downward revisions in the IPO offer price and, upon considering the mediating effects of the price revision, also associated with lower initial returns. In terms of determinants, and after controlling for other factors (e.g., issuer distress, start-up status, size, cash burn), we find that the presence of a management GC disclosure is negatively associated with a proxy for issuer financial incentives to withhold “bad news” and positively associated with the extent of risk factors disclosure. Overall, our results provide support for the information content of voluntary management disclosures of GC uncertainties by IPO issuers, the presence of which is associated with agency and risk motivations.