In this paper we show that supporters reduce donations to nonprofits subsequent to disclosure of high executive compensation. We find evidence consistent with large, sophisticated donors actively seeking out and reacting to compensation information made available in IRS Form 990, while smaller donors react to compensation disclosures in the media. Additional analysis indicates that these results vary systematically across nonprofits, as we find a stronger negative relation in nonprofits classified as more charitable, and a weaker relation in nonprofits that provide services to their donors. In contrast neither grantors nor patrons appear to react to executive compensation disclosures. Data Availability: All data are available from public sources.

Debt covenant violation alters firm dynamics, providing creditors with the right to demand repayment, and via that right, influence firm actions. We provide evidence consistent with creditors employing that channel to influence CEO compensation. Using regression discontinuity analysis, we show that in the year after a covenant violation, after controlling for other factors, CEO compensation is 8.5 percent lower and the CEO's compensation package contains fewer risk-taking incentives, as the vega associated with newly granted options is 26 percent lower. These changes are more pronounced when the creditor has greater influence, such as when the borrower and creditor have a prior lending relationship, the creditor is a highly reputable bank, or when the borrower is financially weaker. We also find that CEOs' risk-taking incentives decrease with the number of debt covenants; in particular, the number of performance debt covenants being breached.

In this paper we examine the effect of filing form 10-K on EDGAR on the incidence of small and large trades. We find that the change to EDGAR filings results in significant increases in the volume of small, but not large trades, during the five-day window (−1, 3) around the filing date. While our data does not allow us to directly examine the trading profits and transactions costs of investors, we are able to examine whether the trading patterns reflect information available in the 10-K differently in the pre- and post-EDGAR period. Using stock return as a proxy for the information content of the 10-K, our results show that post-EDGAR small trades are more likely to reflect that information, i.e., more likely than in the pre-EDGAR period to be buys (sells) when returns in the five-day window after the trade are positive (negative). We also find that while the product of the net buys (sells) and the price change over the five-day window after the trade for small trades in the post-EDGAR period is still less than that for large trades, the difference between the two groups decreased significantly. Consequently, while we cannot directly examine the profitability of these transactions, the evidence presented is consistent with EDGAR improving the trading outcomes of small vis-a`-vis large investors.

In this paper, we test the “labor donation” hypothesis, which posits that intrinsically motivated individuals willingly accept lower compensation to work in nonprofit organizations (NPOs). We do so by examining the response of NPO CEO compensation to exogeneous increases in labor costs resulting from state-level minimum wage hikes, finding these increases are followed by declines in CEO compensation. Consistent with the labor donation hypothesis, we find the declines in compensation are larger for CEOs who we expect to have greater intrinsic motivation, i.e., those whose NPOs are headquartered in counties with higher levels of religiosity, in counties with greater levels of social capital, and those who work for a local NPO as opposed to a national NPO. In contrast to the decline in compensation we observe for NPO CEOs, we do not find an impact on for-profit CEO compensation.