Considerable recent audit regulation, both proposed and mandated, and accounting research has focused on auditor independence threats arising over long auditor tenure. Psychology research, however, suggests independence threats also likely arise when auditor tenure is short because auditors can quickly develop a strong client identity, raising questions about the effectiveness of mandatory audit partner or firm rotation to address independence concerns. Relying on Social Identity Theory, I examine mechanisms for promoting auditor independence that can be implemented regardless of auditor tenure or rotation. I conduct two experiments in a setting with no prior auditor-client history. As predicted, auditors who identify more strongly with their clients, by sharing their values, agree more with the client's preferred accounting treatment, unless the salience or arousal of their professional identity is heightened. Further, as predicted, heightening professional identity salience increases professional skepticism. My results provide an improved understanding of the joint effects of identity strength and salience on auditor judgments and suggest a cost-effective alternative to auditor rotation to maintain auditor independence, even when auditor tenure is short.

Regulators are concerned that auditors do not sufficiently identify and report material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting (ICFR). However, psychological licensing theory suggests reporting material weaknesses could have unintended consequences for acceptance of aggressive client financial reporting. In an experiment, we predict and find auditors accept more aggressive client reporting after they report a material weakness in ICFR than after they report no material weakness. We provide evidence licensing underlies this effect. In a second experiment, we investigate the efficacy of an intervention to reduce the identified licensing effects by prompting an audit quality goal. We find this prompt mitigates the unintended consequence when auditors report a material weakness. While regulators are concerned companies are undeservedly receiving clean ICFR audit opinions, our findings indicate adverse ICFR opinions may lead auditors to give companies undeservedly clean financial statement opinions. We provide a potential remedy to this unintended consequence.

Performance-contingent cash and tangible rewards are commonly used to motivate employees, and the taxation of such rewards is unavoidable. We use two experiments to examine how the effect of reward taxation on employee effort varies by reward type. In Experiment 1, we find reward taxation decreases positive affect, increases negative affect, and decreases reward attractiveness for employees when rewards are tangible, but not when rewards are cash. In Experiment 2, we find reward taxation reduces employee effort when rewards are tangible, but not when rewards are cash. Collectively, this evidence advances knowledge at the intersection of tax and management accounting by explaining why reward type alters the effect of reward taxation on employee effort. Moreover, our experimental results inform managers of a potential downside to using tangible rewards to motivate employees. Data Availability: Authors will make data available on request.