Prior research suggests that audit seniors' judgments are sometimes biased by their affect toward (i.e., feeling of personally liking or disliking) client personnel. We examine how experienced audit reviewers respond when reviewing an audit preparer's judgment that appears to be biased by the preparer's affect toward a client's controller. In our experiment, reviewers are provided with a preparer's judgment that appears inconsistent with the audit workpapers. We then examine the effect of providing versus not providing reviewers with a cue about the preparer's positive or negative affect toward the controller. We find that despite reviewers' belief that affect biases a preparer's judgment, reviewers who are informed of the preparer's affect do not rely less on the preparer's judgment. Instead, they actually rely more on the preparer's judgment than do those who are not informed about the preparer's affect. This result is consistent with Wegner's (1994) ironic rebound effect, which predicts that sometimes when individuals are trying not to rely on information, they ironically rely on it more. Our findings suggest a potential limitation of the audit review process.

The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board recently reported that its inspections show that auditors fail to effectively modify their standard audit procedures in response to fraud risk. Prior academic research is consistent with this finding. Our study examines the effects of two interventions on auditors' planning decisions in a high-fraud-risk setting: strategic reasoning and brainstorming in groups. Both interventions are predicted to lead auditors to more effectively modify their planned audit procedures. We use a panel of fraud experts to identify effective modifications to the audit plan of a specific fraud case. The experts' recommendations are then used to evaluate the effectiveness of practicing auditors' audit plans with and without the two interventions. We predict and find that each intervention leads to more effective modifications to the standard audit procedures and that the combination of the interventions is not significantly more effective than either intervention used alone.

Conventional economics assumes workers provide the same effort under penalty contracts and economically equivalent bonus contracts. However, prior research finds that although workers prefer bonus contracts, they provide more effort under penalty contracts. Given these findings, the prevalence of bonus contracts in practice is puzzling. If penalty contracts yield more worker effort, why would employers not use them more often? We conduct experimental labor markets to test whether the prior finding of more effort under penalty contracts than bonus contracts (i.e., the contract frame effect) persists when workers can choose their contract and know that their employer intentionally offered the contract they choose. As predicted, these features of labor markets eliminate the difference in effort between penalty and bonus contracts reported in prior studies. This finding suggests employers may use bonus contracts more often than penalty contracts because they can offer the contract most workers prefer without sacrificing worker effort.

We conduct an experiment in the securities-based crowdfunding setting to investigate whether some investors avoid accounting information for psychological reasons, even when they understand the information is useful in their decision-making. Results suggest investors who experience relatively more psychological discomfort when working with quantitative information are relatively less likely to acquire the financial statements of a potential crowdfunding investment. Importantly, this effect is incremental to any effect of investors' quantitative ability (i.e., their numeracy) and attenuates with an intervention designed to help investors overcome their psychological discomfort. Altogether, the results extend our understanding of the theory of information avoidance, provide a behavioral explanation for investors' documented underuse of accounting information, and can inform regulators as they revise crowdfunding regulations.

Auditors often receive summary information or conclusions from management about account balances or internal controls. They must then gather evidence to assess whether this information is fairly stated. In such situations, management can be considered the “first mover” and the auditor the “second mover.” When auditors are the second mover, they are vulnerable to the curse of knowledge bias—the inability to ignore previously processed information (Fischhoff 1977). Specifically, because information from management could be incorrect or biased, auditors must arrive at an independent evaluation of the item in question (e.g., year-end book values, accounting estimates, or internal controls). This study examines the general issue of auditors being “second movers” by investigating how their awareness of management’s severity classifications of internal control problems influences auditors’ initial assessments of internal control over financial reporting (ICFR) under Auditing Standard No. 2. Our experimental design allows us to determine that management’s “first mover” influence on auditors’ judgments is an unintentional cognitive effect, rather than an intentional use of management’s classifications. We further examine whether cognitively restructuring the ICFR assessment task reduces management’s influence on auditors’ judgments by asking auditors to evaluate and explicitly document the likelihood and magnitude of the effect of an ICFR problem on the financial statements. We find that cognitively restructuring the task mitigates management’s “first mover” influence on auditors’ judgments.