I investigate how the consolidation of securitization entities under SFAS 166 and 167 spills over to banks' supply of small business loans, which are rarely securitized in the United States. This spillover operates through two channels. (1) In the leverage channel, consolidating banks downsize their entire loan portfolios, both small business loans and other loans, in response to increased leverage after consolidation. (2) In the risk management channel, consolidating banks adjust the mix of loans to maintain optimal diversification. The adjustment can increase the supply of small business loans when their performance covaries positively with the performance of other loans. I find that, on average, banks that consolidate more securitized assets reduce small business lending; consequently, counties with a greater market share of consolidating banks experience slower growth in small businesses. I also identify a small group of banks with sufficiently large positive performance covariance that increase small business lending. Data Availability: All untabulated results are available upon request.

Effective in 2009, SFAS 161 requires enhanced disclosures about derivative use and hedging activities. We test for changes to the information environment of firms whose disclosure policy is unaffected by this standard directly. Using a sample of non-users of derivatives, we find an increase in stock liquidity after their critical customers expand derivative disclosures under SFAS 161. The effect persists for one year and becomes insignificant in subsequent years as the firms dial back their voluntary disclosure. The effect is also more salient for firms that have stronger economic links with their customers and for firms whose customers exhibit more significant improvements in derivative disclosures. The findings suggest that the mandatory derivative disclosures due to SFAS 161 lead to short-term positive information externalities along supply chains. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

Mortgage fraud was a leading force behind the 2008 financial crisis. We measure the fraudulent income overstatement at the bank-ZIP Code-year level as the difference in the local growth between reported income in mortgage applications and the income based on IRS data. We find that overstated income is positively associated with banks’ internal control weaknesses over financial reporting and negatively associated with subsequent remediation of such weaknesses. The associations are concentrated among banks that integrate their accounting and operation processes, as proxied by the adoption of an Enterprise Resource Planning system. Finally, using the removal of internal control provisions in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act in 2005 as a shock to internal control quality, we find that affected banks experience increased income overstatement on mortgage applications. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from the public and proprietary sources identified in the article. Access to proprietary data is subject to the relevant providers’ licensing restrictions.

Contracting parties, such as the firm and its supplier, have cost-reducing incentives to make investments that support the unique transactions between them. However, to the extent that one party may renege on its contractual obligations, the other party incurring the cost of the relationship-specific investment bears additional risk and is less willing to invest such that sub-optimal investment occurs. In countries where enforceability of explicit contracts is particularly weak, parties have incentives to signal their willingness to fulfill implicit claims and maintain long-term relationships. We predict that firms engage in income smoothing to send such a signal to their suppliers. Consistent with these expectations, we find that firms that both reside in countries with weak contract enforceability and operate in industries with a greater need for relationship-specific investments tend to smooth reported income more. We further decompose income smoothing into “informational” and “garbled” components and find that results are driven by the informational component of income smoothing. Our results support the important role that accruals play in providing information in the presence of incomplete contracts.

In the wake of the financial crisis, policymakers expressed the concern that the incurred loss model delays loan loss recognition to economic stress periods and thereby exacerbates banks’ lending contraction during these periods. Addressing this concern, the FASB issued Accounting Standards Update 2016-13, which requires large public banks to accrue for loan losses using the current expected credit loss (CECL) approach starting in January 2020. We hypothesize and find that banks that adopted CECL prior to the COVID-19 pandemic increased loan loss provisions and reduced loan growth during the accompanying recession more than other banks. The lending contraction is stronger for adopting banks with low regulatory capital and low loan impairment and is primarily driven by commercial loans. Lastly, we find that counties in which CECL-adopting banks have higher market share experience larger increases in unemployment rates during the recession and slower subsequent recoveries. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.