We identify two research design issues that explain the inconsistency between the theoretically predicted negative relation between audit effort and misstatements (measured using restatements) and empirical findings. First, auditor risk adjustment behavior induces an upward bias in the association between audit effort and restatements. Second, the theoretical prediction applies only to audited financial reports (i.e., annual reports) and not to unaudited reports (i.e., interim quarterly reports). Comingling restatements of audited with unaudited reports introduces an additional upward bias in the association between audit effort and restatements. After correcting for these two sources of bias, we find a robust negative association between audit effort and annual report restatements. JEL Classification: M49. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources.

Funds from Operations (FFO) is the prevailing performance measure in the Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) industry. However, prior studies are inconclusive about the superiority of FFO over GAAP net income. Because depreciation is the largest reconciling item between FFO and net income, we examine the information content and value relevance of depreciation for both the REIT and non-REIT industries and report the following findings. First, accumulated depreciation is value-relevant for the REIT industry, whereas accumulated depreciation has little value relevance for comparably capital-intensive non-REIT industries. Second, accounting depreciation deviates from economic depreciation to a greater extent for REITs than for non-REIT industries. Third, accumulated depreciation has predictive ability for future revenues for REIT firms, but not for non-REIT firms. Finally, only the REIT industry displays all of these properties. In sum, evidence supports the REIT industry's assertion that GAAP depreciation consistently exceeds economic depreciation and that book value of assets is systematically understated.

Fair value estimates from external third-party sources are generally considered more reliable than internal estimates based on managerial inputs. However, even externally sourced estimates are subject to managerial opportunism, because firms can switch from one external source to another. In the context of life insurance companies that mostly rely on external sources, we posit that such source switches could be driven by managerial incentive either to faithfully report fair values (objective valuation) or to inflate estimates to avoid OTTI (opinion shopping). Our results support both motives. In instances in which the two incentives yield conflicting predictions for source switching, we find the opinion-shopping motive dominates. We also find that switches that increase fair value estimates are associated with a reduced OTTI likelihood and magnitude, especially for high-impairment-risk securities. On balance, our evidence suggests that opportunism with respect to source switching can compromise the reliability of externally sourced fair value estimates. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

We examine the relationship between audit quality and office-level auditor turnover. Using resumes of over 106,000 Big 4 auditors, we find that audit offices with higher turnover have a greater likelihood of client annual report restatements. This detrimental effect is more pronounced when the departing auditors are more experienced and when the office faces tighter human capital constraints and is primarily attributable to voluntary turnover. Further, such negative effect is borne mostly by complex clients and intangible-intensive clients but is weakened for clients with greater product similarity to the client portfolio of the audit office. Last, the impact of office-level turnover on audit quality persists after controlling for firm-level turnover. Our findings inform the current policy debate on whether and to what extent audit firms should disclose auditor turnover as a potential indicator of audit quality. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.