We document that the effect of Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) on public management earnings forecasts (MFs) is asymmetric. Our results suggest that FD increased managers' use of MFs as a downward-guidance mechanism to help achieve meeting or beating earnings expectations. This effect is more pronounced when existing analyst forecasts are optimistic and when firms had selective disclosure policies pre-FD. We also find that the increased use of MFs as downward guidance leads to post-FD reductions in MF quality (accuracy and informativeness) for the downward guiding MFs that are most likely meet/beat motivated, while quality improves for upward-guiding MFs. Finally, our evidence suggests that results from prior research about FD-induced changes in information environment variables, such as analyst forecast quality and investor trading activities, depend on whether the firm issues MFs and whether those MFs are downward guiding. Data Availability: All data are available from public databases identified in the paper

This study investigates the performance effects of the combined use of three reinforcers, or incentive motivators, commonly used by companies: monetary incentives, feedback, and recognition. Using a field experiment in a retail services company, I test whether these incentives, which appeal to diverse motivation mechanisms—tangible payoffs, self-regulation, and social esteem—and, hence, have different utilities, are complements or substitutes. The results of the hard performance data collected, in the form of a ratio of sales relative to goals, show that monetary incentives and recognition are substitutes, while feedback is independent of the other incentives. The negative interaction between monetary incentives and recognition is evidence of crowding out between tangible payoffs and social esteem motivations. Individually, these two incentives have a positive impact on performance of about 13 percentage points, which corresponds to a 32.5 percent performance increase. Feedback interactions and main effects are not statistically significant, which suggests that, in this setting, providing feedback in the form of knowledge of results has no impact

The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board recently proposed amendments to the standard audit report that would require the disclosure of critical audit matters (CAMs), and the Securities and Exchange Commission continues to evaluate the use of principles-based (imprecise) accounting standards within U.S. generally accepted accounting principles. We assert that jurors perceive precise accounting standards to constrain auditors' control over financial reporting outcomes, resulting in a lower propensity for negligence verdicts when the accounting treatment conforms to the precise standard. However, we hypothesize that the use of either imprecise standards or CAMs reduces the extent to which jurors perceive this constraint to exist, leading to increased auditor liability. We present experimental evidence supporting this argument. Our results highlight the similarities between the effects of imprecise accounting standards and CAMs on negligence assessments. These results provide insight for regulators and the auditing profession about the potential consequences of the proposed regulatory changes

Despite the importance placed on professional skepticism by the accounting profession and regulators, the failure of auditors to exercise an appropriate level of skepticism continues to be a global issue. We experimentally test a potential barrier to skepticism. We find that outcome knowledge biases supervisors' evaluations of skeptical behavior. Holding a staff member's skeptical judgments and acts constant, superiors on the engagement team evaluate the staff's skeptical behavior based on whether the staff's investigation of an issue ultimately identifies a misstatement. Our evidence suggests that evaluators penalize auditors who employ an appropriate level of skepticism, but do not identify a misstatement. Although consultation with their superiors while exercising skepticism improved staff auditors' performance evaluations, consultation did not effectively mitigate the outcome effect on their evaluations. Last, we observe that auditors in the field anticipate that their superiors will be influenced by outcome knowledge when they evaluate their skeptical behavior. Collectively, our results depict an evaluation system that may inadvertently discourage skepticism among auditors in the field. Data Availability: Contact the authors

I examine whether a reversal of an abnormal cut in discretionary investments is associated with the degree to which the cut is reflective of real earnings management (REM) and whether and how it predicts future operating performance. I define a reversal as occurring when a firm cuts discretionary investments to a below-expected level in one period and reverts back to at least the expected level of investment during the next period. Unlike accrual earnings management, REM involves deliberately altering the operations of the firm to influence reported accounting numbers. To the extent that such interventions diverge from optimality, they can expose the firm to real economic costs. I find that a reversal of an abnormal cut in discretionary investments in the year after the cut has taken place is indicative of REM. I further find that, on average, reversing cuts are associated with lower future operating performance, but that such results vary significantly depending on the various incentives to engage in REM, as well as other factors that affect its associated costs and benefits. These findings are of interest to investors, regulators, and academics with respect to the identification and consequences of REM

I investigate how the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) affects audit markets. Specifically, I examine the effect of IFRS adoption on the likelihood and direction of auditor switching in a sample of firms from five European Union countries: the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, Italy, and Poland during the period from 1998 through 2010. I hypothesize that IFRS adoption creates an expert advantage for global audit firms (i.e., Big 4 audit firms, Grant Thornton, and BDO) during a regime shift in reporting standards. I find that clients are more likely to switch from small to global audit firms in the year of IFRS adoption. I also hypothesize that the strength of a country's regulatory regime affects the likelihood of auditor replacement around IFRS adoption. I find that firms listed in countries with high-quality regulation and enforcement are significantly more likely to switch from small to global audit firms in the year of IFRS adoption (with the odds of the switch almost doubled when compared to non-adoption years). In weaker regulatory regimes, IFRS adoption is not associated with an increase in auditor switching. Additional tests provide evidence that global audit firms' advantage stems from their perceived IFRS expertise. Finally, the results confirm that not only Big 4, but also Grant Thornton and BDO, benefit from IFRS adoption