In April 2016, the European Union adopted the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), significantly expanding privacy protections for personal data handled by firms. I examine the regulation’s impact on U.S. firms’ internal information quality (IIQ) and operational efficiency. Although privacy regulations target one subset of firms’ information assets (i.e., personal data), they may spur broad improvements in firms’ information governance practices and systems, resulting in higher quality information available for decision-making and, by extension, more efficient operations. Using a difference-in-differences design, I find that U.S. firms with European operations (i.e., treated firms) exhibit improvements in IIQ around the adoption of the GDPR. Furthermore, although the GDPR’s regulatory burden is overall costly to firms, GDPR-induced improvements in IIQ contribute positively to operational efficiency. These findings highlight that privacy regulation can act as a catalyst for firms to improve IIQ, yielding operational benefits that may partially offset the regulation’s costs. Data Availability: All data are available from public sources discussed in the text

Policymakers claim that combating tax avoidance can help reduce industry concentration by leveling the playing field between industry leaders and their competitors. We test the validity of this claim by using administrative data on industry concentration and exploiting the staggered introduction of anti-tax avoidance regulations across 17 European countries. Although these regulations significantly reduce tax avoidance, we find no statistically or economically meaningful effect on industry concentration. Further tests indicate that our nonresults stem from a genuine lack of effect rather than a lack of statistical power and that our inferences are robust to multiple research designs. The sole exception is in industries with both high levels of leader tax-avoidance advantages and multinational presence, but even in these industries, effect sizes are modest and fall short of regulatory benchmarks. Overall, our findings cast doubt on the idea that broad-based anti-tax avoidance regulations can materially influence industry concentration

This paper examines the effect of financial regulation on nonfinancial violations. Using differences in compliance requirements with Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) Section 404, we find that adoption of Section 404 increased firms’ propensity for nonfinancial violations. This effect is stronger for firms with greater external scrutiny toward their financial reporting, greater challenges in monitoring their operations, and limited resources. These results, together with an examination of changes in audit fees, conference call transcripts, and 10-K disclosures, suggest that the effects primarily stem from a shift in attention and resources toward SOX 404. Further, the effects are concentrated in employee-related violations and persist for approximately two years. Overall, our results suggest that financial reporting regulation can result in unintended consequences harming stakeholders, such as employees

We investigate whether prior employment connections influence the strictness of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filing review process. Using novel data on over 250 accountants at the SEC, we define connected examiners as accountants reviewing financial statements audited by their former employer. We find that SEC review teams with a higher percentage of connected examiners are less likely to detect financial statement errors, raise fewer substantive issues, and are less likely to push back on registrants’ responses to comment letters. Our estimates also indicate that the effect of examiners’ prior employment connections is strongest earlier in their SEC tenure and attenuates with time. Our findings provide important practical insights on the boundaries of the revolving door between regulators and the regulated, suggesting that even indirect connections can impact oversight

Many tax-exempt hospitals generate substantial profits. At the same time, regulations governing tax-exempt status prohibit these organizations from issuing equity or operating for the benefit of private owners, leaving managers with unusual discretion over retained resources. This combination makes them especially prone to agency problems. Because hospitals play a central role in the U.S. economy, the costs of weak governance extend beyond the sector itself. We find that tax-exempt hospitals spend more on administrative wages and capital investments than comparable taxable hospitals. At the same time, weaker financial performance accompanies greater mission-related activity. A novel, hand-collected measure of additional state-level oversight reveals that stronger oversight disciplines finances without crowding out mission-related activity. Data Availability: The data used in this study are derived from publicly available sources. Hospital financial and operational data are from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ Hospital Cost Report Information System (HCRIS). County-level demographic data are from the Area Resource File maintained by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Hospital market definitions are from the Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care. The hand-collected measure of state-level oversight (the O-Score) is described in the manuscript and appendices

We examine how the 2016 Municipal Advisor Regulatory Reform, which professionalized municipal advisors by imposing standards of conduct and minimum competency requirements, affected advisory firms and issuers. Using a difference-in-differences (DiD) research design, we find that the reform improved the quality of financial advice provided by independent municipal advisory firms relative to dealer firms. Specifically, independent municipal advisors assemble higher-quality financing teams and ensure greater financial disclosure compliance and timeliness in the post-reform period. These improvements provide tangible economic benefits to issuers through lower bond issuance costs and smaller underwriter fees. Finally, we document that independent advisory firms gain market share and charge higher fees relative to dealer firms after the reform. Overall, our study provides novel evidence linking the professionalization of financial intermediaries to improvements in the quality of advice, financial transparency, and issuer borrowing costs. Data Availability: Data are available from the commercial and public sources identified in the paper.

We investigate whether foreign institutional investors respond to the sustainability disclosures mandated by the EU’s Non-Financial Reporting Directive and whether disclosure location affects their response. We find that foreign institutions increase ownership in companies affected by the mandate and that the increase is greater in countries that locate the sustainability disclosures within their annual reports, referred to as combined reporting. This is consistent with combined reporting reducing investors’ disclosure processing costs by providing timelier disclosure and better integration of sustainability and financial information. We further find that the increase in ownership is greater in countries that experience a larger increase in the number of firms issuing combined reports, consistent with combined reporting increasing comparability of the sustainability disclosures. Our findings suggest that the location of sustainability reporting plays an important role in cross-border investment decisions, which provides policy implications for the implementation of global sustainability disclosure regulation

We examine commonly used indicators of aggressive non-GAAP exclusions and find that the majority perform poorly at identifying low-quality exclusions in terms of decision usefulness for investors. We propose a new firm-quarter-specific indicator that identifies instances in which GAAP earnings quality is high (i.e., when firms have less need to provide non-GAAP metrics) but managers disclose non-GAAP earnings anyway. Our new indicator is easy to calculate, requires minimal data, and performs far better at identifying low-quality exclusions than indicators used in prior research. Using our indicator, we find instances in which managers exclude earnings components that are decision useful, consistent with regulators’ concerns about the quality of some non-GAAP earnings disclosures. Our results are robust to a variety of specification checks. Data Availability: Data are derived from a combination of publicly available sources referenced in the article and third-party subscription data bases

Although rapidly evolving, quality control (QC) systems are a poorly understood determinant of audit quality. We interview 27 QC system leaders to understand how they navigate the challenges they face in changing QC systems. We find that many challenges—including obtaining buy-in, evaluating costs and benefits, and advancing proactive over reactive changes—are caused by conflicting demands arising internally. Consistent with institutional theory, our data reveal that leaders respond to conflicting demands by seeking partial conformity (e.g., negotiating among stakeholders) or by altering the framing of the demands (e.g., using scientific logic to legitimize a QC change). Interviews of eight QC system users complement and corroborate our main results and suggest opportunities for future research. Our study sheds light on how firms update QC systems and informs practitioners, regulators, and academics of the forces that shape the evolution of QC systems. Data Availability: Our data are not publicly available to preserve participant anonymity

In examining the loan contracting implications of SEC investigations, we document that banks charge higher loan spreads when borrowers are under investigation, with the rise in interest rates varying predictably with lender characteristics. Further, our evidence implies that the debt pricing impact of SEC investigations is amplified for borrowers suffering worse credit quality and information asymmetry as well as those relying more on bank loans. These findings suggest that banks perceive increased risk for borrowers under SEC scrutiny while also leveraging their knowledge of the investigations to extract rents. Supplemental analyses reveal tighter nonspread loan terms and a higher likelihood of amending existing loan contracts during SEC investigations. Additionally, the tightening of loan terms reverses for investigations that conclude without enforcement actions. Overall, our research identifies an economic cost of SEC investigations and alerts regulators to these costs when deciding whether to launch an investigation. Data Availability: All data used are available from the sources indicated in the paper