This paper studies the joint effect of borrowing and short-sale constraints under heterogeneous beliefs and risk aversions. Although the constraints never simultaneously bind in equilibrium, interesting economics emerge in the anticipatory effects of potentially future binding constraints. In particular, the risk-free rate and Sharpe ratio experience endogenous jumps at a critical state, where two equilibria coexist. Moreover, a short-sale ban can lead to a lower stock price and higher volatility depending on the relative tightness between the constraints, and tightening the borrowing constraint during a short-sale ban can also make returns more volatile.

By using a unique data set on the organizational structure of fixed-income portfolio managers, that is, mutual funds and insurance companies, we study the effects of organizational hierarchy within a fund management team on bond investing. We document that team hierarchies reduce the portfolio managers’ incentive to collect and share soft information. Funds with multiple hierarchies invest less in bonds of local firms, hold less concentrated portfolios, and herd more with the market. Overall, they deliver lower portfolio performances. We also show that changes in fund hierarchy subsequently find their way into fund behaviors.

Mutual fund returns are significantly related to stock characteristics in the cross-section after controlling for risk via factor models. We develop a new double-adjusted approach that controls for both factor model betas and stock characteristics in one performance measure. The new measure substantially affects performance rankings, with a quarter of funds experiencing a change in their percentile ranking greater than 10. Double-adjusted performance produces strong evidence of persistence in relative performance. Inference based on the new measure often differs, sometimes dramatically, from that based on traditional performance estimates. Received November 22, 2019; editorial decision June 28, 2020; Editor: Jeffrey Pontiff.