Abstract The causes and consequences of the 2008 mortgage meltdown and 2020 COVID-19 crisis are quite different: the 2008 mortgage meltdown reflected infection of the financial system due to excess leverage and poor-quality mortgage loans, and the recent crisis reflects a substantial global economic shock to contain the viral outbreak of the coronavirus. Yet the financial and medical systems share many elements, such as opacity and interconnectedness as well as adequate buffers and reserves. We examine these themes as well as asset pricing, moral hazard (though it was at the root of the crisis only in the Great Recession), the consequences for government as a systemic actor, economic concentration, and capital market regulation in the two crises. In both crises, interventions in financial markets and disruptions in the housing market played important, but differing, roles. The recent crisis elucidates open questions about the foundation of financial economics and risk sharing.

Abstract We investigate intraday return dynamics in currency markets around FOMC announcements. Using comprehensive high-frequency exchange rate data, we reveal that post-FOMC announcement returns are significantly low, cancelling out approximately 65% of positive pre-FOMC announcement drifts. These post-announcement reversals mainly result from uncertainty resolution and are mostly realized between 12 and 24 hours after FOMC announcements. This return behavior is significantly related to the negative jump volatilities driven by FOMC announcements. Our findings suggest that our signed jump volatility measures capture informational shocks and uncertainty resolutions and tend to be high under illiquid market conditions. (JEL G14, G15)

Abstract What distribution best characterizes the time series and cross-section of individual stock returns? To answer this question, we estimate the degree of cross-sectional return skewness relative to a benchmark that nests many models considered in the literature. We find that cross-sectional skewness in monthly returns far exceeds what this benchmark model predicts. However, cross-sectional skewness in long-run returns in the data is substantially below what the model predicts. We show that fat-tailed idiosyncratic events appear to be necessary to explain skewness in the data. (JEL, G10, G11, G12, G13, G14).

Abstract We use data from aggregate stock and dividend futures markets to quantify how investors’ expectations about economic growth evolved across horizons following the outbreak of the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) and subsequent policy responses until July 2020. Dividend futures, which are claims to dividends on the aggregate stock market in a particular year, can be used to directly compute a lower bound on growth expectations across maturities or to estimate expected growth using a forecasting model. We show how the actual forecast and the bound evolve over time. As of July 20th, our forecast of annual growth in dividends points to a decline of 8% in both the United States and Japan and a 14% decline in the European Union compared to January 1. Our forecast of GDP growth points to a decline of 2% in the United States and Japan and 3% in the European Union. The lower bound on the change in expected dividends is -17% in the United States and Japan and -28% in the European Union at the 2-year horizon. News about U.S. monetary policy and the fiscal stimulus bill around March 24 boosted the stock market and long-term growth but did little to increase short-term growth expectations. Expected dividend growth has improved since April 1 in all geographies.

We provide a model in which a single psychological constraint, limited attention, explains both under- and overreaction to different earnings components. Investor neglect of earn-ings induces post-earnings announcement drift and the profit anomaly. Neglect of earnings components causes accrual and cash flow anomalies. The model offers empirical implica-tions relating the strength of earnings-related anomalies to the forecasting power of current earnings-related information for future earnings, investor attentiveness, and the volatilities of and correlation between accruals and cash flows. We also show that, owing to atten-tion costs, in equilibrium not all investors choose to attend to earnings or its components. (JEL G12, G14, M41, M43) Market reactions to earnings and earnings components present a striking puzzle. Stock prices on average underreact to earnings surprises (post-earnings an-nouncement drift), but overreact to the operating accruals component of earn-ings.1 Earnings- and accruals-related patterns of return predictability are often referred to as “anomalies, ” “under- ” and “overreaction, ” or reflecting investor “optimism, ” “pessimism, ” or “naı̈veté. ” Such labels offer little guidance as to

Abstract We provide evidence that investors with leverage constraints demand leverage for the sake of leverage. We study the equity closed-end fund (CEF) market and document a strong positive relation between fund leverage and CEF premiums, indicating that investors pay a relative premium for leverage. We perform a quasi-natural experiment and identify leverage as a causal driver of the premium. Leverage changes do not signal improved fund performance. Instead, the only benefit to investors of increased leverage is amplified exposure via greater volatility and risk exposure. We supply external validity by relating our results to the betting-against-beta factor. (JEL G12, G14, G32)

Prior literature shows that implied volatility spreads between call and put options are positively related to future underlying stock returns. In this paper, however, we demonstrate that the volatility spreads are negatively related to future out-of-the-money call option returns. Using unique data on option volumes, we reconcile the two pieces of evidence by showing that option demand by sophisticated, firm investors drives the positive stock return predictability based on volatility spreads, while demand by less sophisticated, customer investors drives the negative call option return predictability. Overall, our evidence suggests that volatility spreads contain information about both firm fundamentals and option mispricing. (JEL G12, G13, G14, L83)

We construct a simple measure of the aggregate illiquidity of hedge fund portfolios, based on the cross-sectional average first-order autocorrelation coefficient of hedge fund returns, and show that it has strong and robust in- and out-of-sample forecasting power for 72 portfolios of international equities, U.S. corporate bonds, and currencies over the 1994 to 2013 period. The forecasting ability of hedge fund illiquidity for asset returns is in most cases greater than, and provides independent information relative to, well-known predictive variables. We rationalize these findings using a simple equilibrium model, in which hedge funds provide liquidity in asset markets.