We find that the degree of expected idiosyncratic skewness in seasoned equity issuers’ stock returns is an important determinant of flotation costs and subsequent abnormal stock performance. High skewness issuers incur significantly greater offer price discounts, particularly when institutional share allocation is largest, pay higher gross underwriting spreads, and exhibit poorer stock performance in the three years after issuance, all compared to low skewness issuers. These results suggest that skewness-induced overpricing increases the flotation costs of seasoned equity offers and leads to poor subsequent stock performance.

We examine real outcomes for biotech startups going public around the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act. Reduced compliance costs associate with greater innovation capital formation as biotech IPO volume and proceeds increase after the JOBS Act. Biotechs, which conduct over 30% of IPOs since 2012, go public with products earlier in the FDA approval process and more frequently target rare diseases and cancer. Consistent with our survey evidence that managers use compliance savings to invest in R&D, we link the JOBS Act to post-IPO increases in project-level development, such as new patents, clinical trials, and staffing of laboratories. Post-JOBS Act product candidates are more likely to reach key milestones in the FDA approval process and these startups fail at lower rates. Benefits accrue to shareholders without sacrificing financial reporting quality. Our results demonstrate how tailoring regulations for startups can provide economic and societal benefits.

We examine the relation between venture capital (VC) investments, M&A activity, and merger competition laws in 45 countries around the world. We find evidence of a strong positive association between VC investments and lagged M&A activity, consistent with an active M&A market providing viable exit opportunities for VC companies and therefore incentives for venture capitalists to invest. We also explore the effects of country-level merger competition laws and pro-takeover legislation passed internationally on VC activity. We find significant reductions in VC activity in countries with stricter competition laws and find that VC activity intensifies after the enactment of country-level takeover-friendly legislation.

Studies proposing new determinants of corporate innovation include previously identified factors in an ad hoc manner. We find that only a sparse set of recently proposed innovation determinants provide material, independent information about patents and citations. We document that inferences in recent empirical studies often change when we include previously discovered innovation determinants. Commonly used econometric methods, including fixed effects and plausible shocks, do not always mitigate the need to condition on previously identified innovation determinants. Rather than randomly selecting a subset of control variables from prior studies, our analysis offers researchers a framework to consider previously proposed variables.

How does lending-market competitiveness shape new firms’ financing? Using a unique U.S. representative panel of new firms, we document that in more concentrated local lending markets: (a) new firms are less likely to access credit; (b) new firms have lower leverage; and (c) the best-performing firms are more severely affected by reduced debt financing. We develop a contingent-claims model with monopolistically competitive banks that rationalizes these facts and shows how credit-market conditions determine loan fees and concentration. Our findings highlight banks’ market power as a channel through which the financial sector influences firms’ development and, hence, economic growth.

Owning valuable brands enhances the financial well-being of firms not only through increased revenues and profitability but also by mitigating agency problems, earnings management, and financial reporting irregularities. Firms with high brand equity are less likely to have income-inflating discretionary accruals, announce earnings restatements, or experience SEC investigations. Brand equity reduces the likelihood of manipulation through incentive and opportunity channels, which we capture in CEO characteristics and compensation, and corporate governance measures. Brand equity reduces the likelihood of financial reporting irregularities more for durable goods firms and firms with shorter-tenured CEOs, as the latter are most vulnerable to performance pressures. (JEL G31, G34, M31, M37, M41, M42) Received September 28, 2019; editorial decision May 27, 2020 by Editor Isil Erel.