We analyze how firms renegotiate labor contracts to extract concessions from labor. While anecdotal evidence suggests that firms tend to renegotiate wages downward in times of financial distress, there is no empirical evidence that documents such renegotiation, its determinants, and its magnitude. This article attempts to fill this gap. Using a unique data set of airlines, which includes detailed information on wages and pension plans, we document an empirical link between airline financial distress, pension underfunding, and wage concessions.

We study the evolution of investment-banking relationships from 1933 to 2007. Relationship exclusivity and client concerns for the state of their banking relationships were strong through the first part of our sample period but then entered a period of sharp decline beginning around 1970. We interpret the bank-client relationship as an informal governance mechanism for curbing opportunistic behavior in a weak contracting environment and examine how technological change aggravated conflicts of interest within investment banks and between banks and their clients. This perspective sheds light on why trust between banks and their clients now appears to be in short supply.Received March 2, 2018; editorial decision June 11, 2018 by Editor Paolo Fulghieri.

Donald Trump’s 2016 election and his nomination of climate skeptic Scott Pruitt to head the Environmental Protection Agency drastically downshifted expectations about U.S. policy toward climate change. Joseph Biden’s 2020 election shifted them dramatically upward. We study firms’ stock-price movements in reaction to these changes. As expected, the 2016 election boosted carbon-intensive firms. Surprisingly, firms with climate-responsible strategies also gained, especially those firms held by long-run investors. Such investors appear to have bet on a “boomerang” in climate policy. Harbingers of a boomerang appeared during Trump’s term. The 2020 election marked its arrival.

Using a novel typology of serial acquirers, we examine several puzzles documented in the prior literature. We show that acquisitions by different types of acquirers are driven by different factors, they acquire different sizes of targets, and subsequent acquisitions by acquirers are predictable ex ante. Controlling for market anticipation, the most frequent serial acquirers do not earn declining returns as they continue acquiring, while less frequent acquirers do. Our methodology enhances our understanding of serial acquisition dynamics, anticipation, and economic value adjustments. The methodology is likely to be relevant to topics related to event anticipation beyond those covered in this study.

We examine expectation documents’ effectiveness as an activism tool. We use the Norwegian sovereign wealth fund’s release of a corporate governance expectation document as a natural experiment. We introduce a novel, three-way analytical decomposition of the firms, the fund, and their joint response to this document. Firms’ governance practices adapt to the fund’s new portfolio-wide governance preferences, with heterogeneous responses across ownership and firm characteristics. The fund’s investment policies also change, even at the expense of financial returns. Overall, our research demonstrates the potential effectiveness of expectation documents as an emerging, low-cost activism tool for universal investors.

Many of the events that trigger clawback provisions are associated with risky corporate policies and variable performance outcomes. We propose and test the hypothesis that clawback provisions motivate managers to reduce firm risk. Panel ordinary least squares, general method of moments with instrumental variables, and propensity square matching models all indicate that clawback provisions decrease the volatility of stock returns. The channels that connect clawback presence to firm risk include more conservative investment and financial policies. The clawback-induced reduction in risk-taking appears to benefit shareholders on average. The gains from reduced risk-taking are larger for firms with fewer growth options, lower R&D, and prior wrongdoing.