Knowledge that Transforms

Abstract We derive three testable predictions from a bank-P2P lender model of competition: (a) P2P lending grows when some banks are faced with exogenously higher regulatory costs; (b) P2P loans are riskier than bank loans; and (c) the risk-adjusted interest rates on P2P loans are lower than those on bank loans. We test these predictions against data on P2P loans and the consumer bank credit market in Germany and find empirical support. Overall, our analysis indicates that P2P lenders are bottom fishing, especially when regulatory shocks create a competitive disadvantage for some banks. (JEL G21)

Abstract We use the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s Housing Choice Voucher program as a setting to evaluate the interaction of homeownership and race on the wealth accumulation of low-income households. Using a within-treatment difference-in-differences framework, we establish that low-income households that receive assistance in owning a home experience increased wealth accumulation relative to their tenure as renters. These wealth gains are not present among low-income minority households. Our findings provide evidence that homeownership is a driver of wealth formation for low-income households and that homeownership does not inherently reduce racial disparities in wealth. (JEL G51, J15, R21).

Abstract Certification by analysts on a FinTech platform that harnesses the “wisdom of crowds” is associated with successful initial coin offerings (ICOs). We show that favorable ratings by a group of analysts with diverse backgrounds positively predict fundraising success and long-run token performance. Analysts’ ratings also help detect potential fraud ex ante. We document that analysts have career concerns and are incentivized by the platform to issue informative ratings. Overall, our results suggest that a market-based certification process that relies on a diverse group of individuals is at play in financing blockchain startups. (JEL D82, G11, G24, G32, G34, L26).

Abstract We study the determinants of firms’ LGBTQ+ policies and their relation to general CSR policies. Common factors explain LGBTQ+ policies related to firms’ primary stakeholders and those aimed at public LGBTQ+ efforts: younger firms, those with more financial resources, more educated workforces, catering to retail customers, and located in liberal areas have more LGBTQ+-friendly policies. LGBTQ+ initiatives encounter less societal agreement than CSR initiatives. Illustrating the distinctiveness of LGBTQ+ issues in the CSR space, we find that firms’ LGBTQ+ friendliness only weakly correlates with overall CSR performance. Lastly, we show that firms’ LGBTQ+ policies respond to pressure from shareholder proposals. (JEL G32, G34, G38)

Abstract Credit ratings of corporations are biased, but the forces driving this bias are unclear. We argue it would be difficult for rating agencies to issue high grades for a firm’s debt when there are a lot of objective equity analyst reports about the firm’s earnings that are informative about its default. We find that an exogenous drop in analyst coverage leads to greater optimism-bias in ratings, especially for firms with little bond analyst coverage and those that are close to default. This coverage-induced shock leads to less informative ratings about future defaults and downgrades and more subsequent bond security mispricings. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Abstract We investigate how capital requirements affect loan rates by studying the 50% increase in the risk weight for high volatility commercial real estate (HVCRE) loans under Basel III. Exploiting variation in loan terms and exposure to the period after the rule’s implementation, we find that a one-percentage-point increase in capital requirements raises loan rates by 8.5 basis points. Using a model of bank funding costs, we demonstrate the timing and scope of the HVCRE rule implies our estimate reflects the steady-state cost of capital requirements. (JEL G21, G28, G38)