I study asset fire sales by commercial banks during the financial crisis. Specifically, I find that banks with lower liquidity levels post lower asking prices, receive lower sale prices, and are less likely to sell REO properties to natural buyers. Further analysis shows that the results are unlikely to be driven by omitted variables related to local conditions, property characteristics, or bank characteristics. To establish causality, I use the losses banks incur due to house price drops as the instrument for bank liquidity and find similar results in two-stage least-squares instrumental variable regressions.

Constructing a comprehensive data set of financially distressed firms that restructured their debts from 2000–2014, we find that firms with financial institutions’ loan-equity simultaneous holdings are more likely to restructure out of court than to file for bankruptcy. The effect is stronger when loans are oversecured and when the expected bankruptcy costs are larger. We use mergers of financial institutions and instrumental variable estimations to address potential endogeneity concerns. Firms with simultaneous holdings experience higher stock returns. The evidence suggests that mitigating shareholder-creditor conflict results in cost-effective resolutions of financial distress.