Regulators condition bank capital on risk but struggle to measure risk accurately. Capital requirements thus rely on inputs from banks’ internal risk models, and banks have discretion over modeling choices. Using novel hand-collected data we show that reported bank risk varies systematically with simulation method, holding period, and historical data size. Hence, modeling choices can be a significant channel of underreporting of risk. Consistent with this presumption we find that less-capitalized banks tend to choose less conservative methods. Moreover, banks using a softer simulation method display higher actual market risk, while reporting lower market risk to regulators

Nonbank financial intermediaries (NBFIs) have grown significantly relative to banks. We argue that this growth reflects a transformation of the activities and risks of banks and NBFIs, driven at least in part by changes in bank regulation. We document through new regulatory data, case studies, and empirical analyses that banks remain special as providers of both routine and emergency liquidity to NBFIs and that the sectors have become increasingly interdependent. We discuss some potential regulatory responses, including considering the two sectors holistically and exploring new ways to internalize the costs of systemic risk arising from bank-NBFI interconnectedness

We model credibility challenges financial regulators often face when disclosing bank stress test results. Since disclosures influence banks’ risk-taking and depositors’ withdrawal decisions, regulators may have incentives to misreport. We show that regulators can reveal results credibly through imprecise disclosures to both banks and depositors. The regulator reveals only the range or the interval in which the result lies. Crucially, our findings indicate that stress test results can be disclosed credibly without assuming that the regulator is committed to truthful disclosure