OUR object in this paper is to study the capital intensity of some of the industries of the underdeveloped economies and to compare it with the capital intensity of the corresponding industries of the developed economies. An underdeveloped economy is characterized by a large quantity of labor relative to the capital stock and a low propensity to save out of a given income, while a developed economy has a large capital stock relative to the available labor force and a high propensity to save out of a given income. We shall expect, therefore, that the real wage rate will be lower and the rate of

Using a nonparametric bounding method and data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, I examine the effect that growing up in a household that receives Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) has on welfare participation as a young adult. In light of the ambiguities created by the selection problem, a number of alternative assumptions and estimates are presented. While the data alone cannot be conclusive, the results generally strengthen the evidence that being exposed to AFDC as a child increases both the probability and the expected duration of future welfare participation.

Statistical analysis is used to evaluate trends in the relative prices of natural resource commodity aggregates and to predict the adequacy of natural resource supplies. The model incorporates the Brown-Durbin custom test and Quandt's log-liklihood ratio. The results indicate that a relative price series is not stable enough to predict a consistent pattern of change and it would be unwise to base materials and extraction policies on this framework. This conclusion is reached, in part, because of the significant changes in the US economy and institutions in recent years. 22 references.

cumulate. But a simpler solution may well be heavier taxes and compulsory loans (i.e., taxloans). These, together with income control and, where necessary, adequate price and supply controls, may keep the supply of money in check and induce additional demand for money for holding. Only in so far as the seriousness of the world situation does not justify generous use of controls and the liquidity problem continues to threaten stability, would special incentives to non-banking lenders be justified. In short, we should seek help in the fight against inflation wherever it can be had; but we are not optimistic concerning the contribution likely to be had from monetary policy. In the present (Spring, I951) state of the world crisis, we should depend primarily on fiscal policy and secondarily on limited income and other controls. Monetary policy may be helpful, but as the crisis deepens it is likely, as in the past emergencies, to become increasingly passive. In this discussion, I have not dealt with the restraints on monetary expansion exercised through controls of particular types of loans, or even rationing of total loans or freezes on the amount outstanding. These, in fact, belong to the category of direct controls and not to general monetary control operating through changes in the price of money.

mHE enormous growth of the public debt during World War II has been widely interpreted as a crippling restraint upon monetary policy. It has taken the exposure and experience of several years to demonstrate that this debt has, in fact, created a great new potential for monetary control. Although that potential has not yet been extensively utilized, the issues that have been raised as a limited application of the new power has been attempted are already coming under the scrutiny of scholarly analysis and of Congressional investigation. The process of discovery has, of course, been piecemeal; no one has yet produced a comprehensive formulation of the emerging possibilities; and in many quarters there has not yet been any real recognition or understanding of what has come about. Each of the three publications reviewed in the present paper deals with important segments of the new monetary doctrine that is slowly coalescing from the controversies aroused by Federal Reserve System policy over the past several years. Dr. Goldenweiser, uniquely suited for his task by more than a quarter century of participation in monetary policy formation at the highest levels, combines in very short space a clear, elementary, description of Federal Reserve functions, a succinct critical review of the principal actions taken by the System since its founding, and an outline of the measures he considers necessary to make adequate use of monetary control in its present environment.' Professor Bach's book, based largely upon his work for the Hoover Commission on governmental reorganization, is concerned more with the methods than with the substance of Federal Reserve policy-making.2 Although Bach sees less clearly than the others the new opportunities for monetary control, his description of System procedures fills a long-felt need, and his provocative suggestions for strengthening the control apparatus (while not altogether acceptable in the judgment of this reviewer) acquire added significance as the stature of monetary policy is enlarged. The Report of the Subcommittee on Monetary, Credit, and Fiscal Policies, prepared under the chairmanship of Senator Paul Douglas (and referred to henceforth in this review as the Douglas Report), represents the most penetrating Congressional investigation into monetary and banking questions that has been made since the founding of the Federal Reserve System.3 Taken with its two supporting documents, a digest of replies to questionnaires and a volume of hearings, the Douglas Report provides a range of new materials on both the mechanics and the substance of monetary control that could not possibly be catalogued in the space available here. Ignoring the valuable descriptive sections in the Bach and Goldenweiser books,4 as well as those contained in the Douglas Subcommittee documents, the present paper will be devoted to the principal issues for policy and organization that emerge from them. On the substantive side there are three key questions: (I) why is effective control over the money supply and the availability of credit necessary; (2) how is effectiveness in monetary and credit control to be achieved; and (3) what guides or criteria should determine the timing and direction of policy actions? Three further questions arise in considering the details of technique and administration: (4) what tools are needed, both general and selective, to implement the over-all requirements for effectiveness in monetary control; (5) how should the Federal Reserve System be organized internally to achieve the highest level of performance in policy-making and in administration; and (6) how should Federal Reserve policy be coordinated externally with the activities of other credit agencies, and with the broad economic program of the governmental administration? What follows is a brief