This paper estimates neighborhood effects on adult labor market outcomes using the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) housing mobility experiment. We propose and implement a new strategy for identifying transition-specific effects that exploits identification of the unobserved component of a neighborhood choice model. Estimated local average treatment effects (LATEs) are large, result from moves between the first and second deciles of the national distribution of neighborhood quality, and pertain to a subpopulation of nine percent of program participants.

This paper uses world running records by age to estimate a biological frontier of decline rates. Two models are compared: a linear/ quadratic (LQ) model and a nonparametric model. Two estimation methods are used: (a) minimizing the squared difference between the observed records and the modeled biological frontier and (b) using extreme value theory to estimate the biological frontier that maximizes the probability of observing the existing world records by age. The results support the LQ model and suggest a linear percentage decline up to the late 70s and quadratic decline after that.

Grogger and Ridgeway (2006) use the daylight saving time shift to develop a police racial profiling test that is based on differences in driver race visibility and (hence) the race distribution of traffic stops across daylight and darkness. However, urban environments may be well lit at night, eroding the power of their test. We refine their test using streetlight location data in Syracuse, New York, and the results change in the direction of finding profiling of black drivers. Our preferred specification suggests that the odds of a black driver being stopped (relative to nonblack drivers) increase 15% in daylight compared to darkness.

U.S. credit unions serve 93 million members, hold 10% of U.S. savings deposits, and make 13.2% of all nonrevolving consumer loans. Since 1985, the share of U.S. depository institution assets held by credit unions has nearly doubled, and the average (inflation-adjusted) size of credit unions has increased over 600%. We use a local-linear estimator, dimesion-reduction techniques, and bootstrap methods to estimate and make inference about ray scale and expansion-path scale economies. We find substantial evidence of increasing returns to scale among credit unions of all sizes, suggesting that further consolidation and growth among credit unions are likely.

This paper develops a correlated probit model to describe dichotomous choices that may contain a public-goods component or some other forms of interdependency. The key contribution of the paper is to formulate tests for interdependent behavior among agents. In particular, we examine the decisions by nations whether or not to ratify the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. Specifically, we reject free riding as a motive for not ratifying the Protocol, and we find little evidence that individual nations were influenced by the behavior of their largest trading partners. Hence, the data suggest that, with respect to the Montreal Protocol, most nations acted without regard for the actions of other nations.

Stigma is a negative attribute of real estate acquired by environmental contamination and reflected in its value (Elliot-Jones, 1996). Using a model of neighborhood turnover with external economies, we show that both temporary stigma and long-term stigma are possible equilibrium outcomes after the discovery and cleanup of a hazardous waste site. The existence and duration of stigma are examined using hedonic price techniques with data from housing sales prices in Dallas County, Texas. We find that results depend critically on distance from the hazardous waste site. Neighborhood turnover due to changes in the level of poverty also appears likely.

A model of major league baseball is developed which distinguishes between league behavior and individual team behavior. The league is viewed as setting rules that restrict the team's willingness to pay and/or impose costs on the transfer of players between teams. Given these rules, teams then compete for player services. The model is estimated and tested. The evidence suggests that the restrictive effect of league rules on player salaries declined between 1986-1988 and 1989-1991, consistent with anecdotal evidence. Within the rules established by the league, however, teams appear to behave as competitive price-takers through the entire sample period.

We develop a procedure to rank-order objects using censored panel data sets. We illustrate this by ranking countries and commodities using disaggregated American import data and find evidence that countries and commodities can be ranked. Countries habitually begin to export goods to the United States according to an ordering; goods are also exported in order. We estimate these orderings using a methodology, that takes account of the fact that most goods are not exported by most countries in our sample. Our orderings seem sensible, robust, and intuitive, and they are correlated with macroeconomic phenomena such as productivity and growth rates.

This paper seeks to identify the characteristics that make individual U.S. banks more likely to fail or be acquired. We use bank-specific information to estimate competing-risks hazard models with time-varying covariates. We use alternative measures of productive efficiency to proxy management quality, and find that inefficiency increases the risk of failure while reducing the probability of a bank's being acquired. Finally, we show that the closer to insolvency a bank is (as reflected by a low equity-to-assets ratio) the more likely is its acquisition.

This paper uses micro-level historical data to examine the causes of bank failure.For statecharactered Kansas banks during 19 10-28, time-to-failure is explicitly modeled using a proportional hazards framework.In addition to standard financial ratios, this study includes membership in the voluntary state deposit insurance system and measures of technical efficiency to explain bank failure.The results indicate that deposit insurance system membership increased theprobability of failure and banks which were technically inefficient were more likely to fail than technically efficient banks.