Knowledge that Transforms

Self-control problems constitute a potential explanation for the underinvestment in preventive health in low-income countries. Behavioral economics offers a tool to solve such problems: commitment devices. We conduct a field experiment to evaluate the effectiveness of different types of theoretically motivated commitment contracts in increasing preventive doctor visits by hypertensive patients in rural India. Despite achieving high take-up of such contracts in some treatment arms, we find no effects on actual doctor visits or individual health outcomes. A substantial number of individuals pay for commitment but fail to follow through on the doctor visit, losing money without experiencing health benefits. We develop and structurally estimate a prespecified model of consumer behavior under present bias with varying levels of naiveté. The results are consistent with a large share of individuals being partially naive about their own self-control problems: sophisticated enough to demand some commitment but overly optimistic about whether a given level of commitment is sufficiently strong to be effective. The results suggest that commitment devices may in practice be welfare diminishing, at least in some contexts, and serve as a cautionary tale about their role in health care.

This study considers the experience of china's one-child policy to examine how fertility restrictions affect economic and social outcomes over a lifetime. Using variations in these penalties across provinces and over time, we find that exposure to stricter fertility restrictions when young leads to higher education levels, more white-collar jobs, delayed marriage, and lower fertility rates. Further consequences include lower rates of residing with the elderly and higher household income, consumption, and savings. Finally, exposure to stricter fertility restrictions in early life increases female empowerment. Overall, fertility restrictions imposed when people are young have powerful effects throughout their life cycle.

This paper considers the impact of the minimum wage on both labor and product markets using detailed store-level scanner data. I provide empirical evidence that a 10% increase in the minimum wage raises grocery store prices by 0.6% to 0.8% and suggest that the minimum wage not only raises labor costs but also affects product demand, especially in poorer regions. This points to novel channels of heterogeneity in pass-through that have distributional consequences, with key implications for real wage inequality. I also find that price rigidity within retail chains ameliorates these effects, reducing the pass-through elasticity for retail prices by about 60%.

We present experimental evidence on the impact of the use of double-fortified salt in school meals on anemia, cognition, and the learning outcomes of primary school children in rural Bihar, one of the poorest regions of India. We find that a year-long intervention had statistically significant positive impacts on hemoglobin levels and reduced anemia by 20%; however, these health gains did not translate into significant impacts on cognitive performance, test scores, and school attendance. Treatment effects on anemia and test scores were larger for children with higher school attendance. The findings indicate that school-based health interventions are a cost-effective and scalable approach for reducing anemia among school children in resource-constrained countries.

How do barriers to the diffusion of academic research affect innovation? In 2008, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) mandated free online availability of funded research. This policy caused a 50 percentage point increase in free access to funded articles. We introduce a novel measure, in-text patent citations, to study how this mandate affected industry use of academic science. After 2008, patents cite NIH-funded research 12% to 27% more often. Nonfunded research, funded research in journals unaffected by the mandate, and academic citations see no change. These estimates are consistent with a model of search for useful knowledge. Inefficiency caused by academic publishing may be substantial.

We study the causal relationship between geographic connectedness and development using one of the earliest massive trade expansions: the first systematic crossing of open seas in the Mediterranean during the time of the Phoenicians. We construct a geography-based measure of connectedness along the shores of the sea. We relate connectedness to economic activity, which we measure using the presence of archaeological sites. We find an association between better-connected locations and archaeological sites during the Iron Age, at a time when sailors began to cross open water routinely on a large scale. We corroborate these findings at the world level.

This paper examines the effect of the female-to-male wage ratio, “relative wage,” on women's spouse quality, marriage, and labor supply over three decades. Exploiting task-based demand shifts as a shock to relative pay, I find that a higher relative wage (a) increases the quality of women's mates, as measured by higher spousal education; (b) reduces marriage without substitution to cohabitation; and (c) raises women's hours of work. These effects are consistent with a model in which a higher relative wage increases the minimum nonpecuniary benefits (“quality”) women require from a spouse and therefore reduce marriage among low-quality husbands.

Networks may rewire in response to interventions. We propose a measure of the treatment effect when an intervention affects the structure of a social network. We develop a treatment-response model that incorporates dynamic peer effects and provide its identification conditions and the associated instrumental-variable strategy. We illustrate our estimation procedure using a panel data set containing information on a financial network before and after a field experiment that randomized access to savings accounts. Results show that neglecting the network change results in underestimation of the impact of the intervention and the role played by informal networks through which the intervention diffuses.

Governments in the United States must offer free legal services to low-income people accused of crimes. To provide these services, many jurisdictions rely on assigned counsel systems, where private attorneys represent indigent defendants on a contract basis. These defendants are more likely to be convicted and incarcerated than defendants with privately retained attorneys. Using detailed court records, we investigate the mechanisms behind this disparity and consider their policy implications. We find that adverse selection among lawyers is not the primary contributor to the assigned counsel penalty. We conclude that reform efforts should address moral hazard in assigned counsel systems.

This paper estimates the effect of social connectedness on crime across U.S. cities from 1970 to 2009. Migration networks among African Americans from the South generated variation across destinations in the concentration of migrants from the same birth town. Using this novel source of variation, we find that social connectedness considerably reduces murders, rapes, robberies, assaults, burglaries, and motor vehicle thefts, with a one standard deviation increase in social connectedness reducing murders by 21 percent and motor vehicle thefts by 20 percent. Social connectedness especially reduces murders of adolescents and young adults committed during gang and drug activity.