Using the marginal value of characteristics, we show how to construct bounds on the exact hedonic price index. When prices are above marginal costs then our bounds still apply, but the value of characteristics cannot be measured so easily from a hedonic regression. Since the price--cost markups are an omitted variable, they will bias the coefficients obtained. For a special class of utility functions, we argue that a linear regression will still provide a measure of the marginal value of characteristics, but a log-linear regression will overstate these values.

Empirical estimation of input market power hindered by problems in measuring an input's value of marginal product (VMP). By estimating a variable profit function system, however, one can infer a factor's VMP through its shadow price. This technique is used here to specify a structural equation system, which is estimated using time series data for the U.S. sawmilling and paper industries, to empirically measure the degree of oligopsony power for sawlog and pulpwood inputs respectively. Results evaluated at sample means indicate that pulpwood markets are more oligopsonistic than sawlog markets, though both perform closer to perfect competition than monopsony. Time trends for market power differ for each product and perfect competition cannot be rejected for sawlogs in later years. Copyright 1995 by MIT Press.

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This paper uses micro-level historical data to examine the causes of bank failure.For statecharactered Kansas banks during 19 10-28, time-to-failure is explicitly modeled using a proportional hazards framework.In addition to standard financial ratios, this study includes membership in the voluntary state deposit insurance system and measures of technical efficiency to explain bank failure.The results indicate that deposit insurance system membership increased theprobability of failure and banks which were technically inefficient were more likely to fail than technically efficient banks.

Terence C. Mills, Gianluigi Pelloni, Athina Zervoyianni, Unemployment Fluctuations in the United States: Further Tests of the Sectoral-Shifts Hypothesis, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 77, No. 2 (May, 1995), pp. 294-304