This paper provides direct evidence on the extent of monopsony power in the low-wage labor market by estimating the firm-level elasticity of labor supply for nurse aides in the long-term care (nursing home) industry. Using exogenous variation in hiring induced by the passage of a state minimum nurse staffing law, I find that facilities initially out of compliance with the new law did not have to raise their wage offers relative to their competitors in order to hire more nurses. While this is consistent with perfect competition in simple monopsony models of the labor market, I discuss how the results may be more ambiguous in more complicated models.

This paper examines the relationship between the minimum high school dropout age and juvenile arrest rates by exploiting state-level variation in dropout age laws. County-level arrest data for the period 1980 to 2008 and difference-in-difference-in-difference-type empirical strategy are used to compare the arrest rates over time of various age groups within counties that differ by their state's minimum dropout age. The evidence suggests that minimum dropout age requirements have a significant and negative effect on property and violent crime arrest rates for individuals 16 to 18 years old. The results are consistent with an incapacitation effect of schooling.

Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) showed the importance of multilateral resistance general equilibrium effects in estimating the response of trade flows to trade costs. We integrate this into Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein's (2008) extension of Anderson and van Wincoop's framework, which allows for firm heterogeneity, in order to quantify the different margins of adjustment. For bilateral trade cost changes, the general equilibrium effects are small. Surprisingly, most country pairs reduce their trade after a multilateral fall in trade costs. The global trade response to lower costs is positive, amplified by firm entry, but significantly dampened by multilateral resistance.