We study how a market uses temporary workers to accommodate extraordinary demand shocks. When COVID-19 surges, hospitals need additional nurses—especially in specialties central to COVID-19 care. By comparing markets for COVID-relevant and other specialties, we show that the market for travel nurses expands dramatically and estimate travel nurse labor supply across space. Supply is quite elastic, as workers can choose to travel where they are needed. Workers travel longer distances to temporary jobs when payment increases, suggesting that an integrated national market facilitates reallocation when demand spikes. But when national cases peak, travel distance is less responsive to local demand.

We propose improved standard errors and an asymptotic theory for two-way clustered panels. Our theory allow for arbitrary serial dependence in the common time effects, which is excluded by existing two-way methods. Our asymptotic distribution theory is the first which allows for this level of inter-dependence. Under weak conditions, we demonstrate that OLS is asymptotically normal, our proposed variance estimator is consistent, and t-ratios are asymptotically standard normal. The results extend to two-way fixed-effect models; we argue that two-way clustering is still necessary even if two-way fixed effects are included. Simulation and empirical illustration are provided.

In 1966, Southern hospitals were barred from participating in Medicare unless they discontinued their longstanding practice of racial segregation. Using data from five Deep South states and exploiting county-level variation in Medicare certification dates, we find that gaining access to an ostensibly integrated hospital had no effect on Black postneonatal mortality. Similarly, there is little evidence that the campaign contributed to the trend towards in-hospital births among Southern Black mothers. These results are consistent with descriptions of the hospital desegregation campaign as producing only cosmetic changes and illustrate the limits of anti-discrimination policies imposed upon reluctant actors.

Worker shortages are common in many industries. This paper examines the effect of government subsidies to address these shortages in the context of a reform that tied Medicaid payments to nursing home staffing levels. We find that the reform substantially increased staffing, especially for facilities serving many Medicaid patients. Facilities responded primarily by hiring workers in lower-wage roles rather than increasing hours of incumbent or high-wage staff. This contrasts with null effects we estimate for a non-incentivized rate increase, suggesting that the incentive structure of government payments—rather than just the level—is key to boosting employment in sectors facing worker shortages.

Experimental research in behavioral economics focuses on consumer behaviors. Similar experimental research on profit-maximizing producers is rare. In three field experiments involving commercial agricultural producers in the United States, we detect evidence of anchoring in competitive auctions for conservation contracts related to nutrient and pest management that were worth, on average, nearly $9,000. In these auctions, the value of the starting cost-share bid was randomized to be either 0% or 100%. When the starting value was 100%, final bids were 46% higher, on average. We find weak evidence that experience with conservation contracts may modestly attenuate the anchoring effect.

This paper evaluates the impact of a sudden and unexpected nationwide alcohol sales ban in South Africa. We find that this policy causally reduced injury-induced mortality in the country by at least 14%. We argue that this estimate constitutes a lower bound on the true impact of alcohol on injury-induced mortality. We also document a sharp drop in violent crimes, indicating a tight link between alcohol and aggressive behavior in society. Our results underscore the severe harm that alcohol can cause and point toward a role for policy measures that target the heaviest drinkers in society.