We test the hypothesis that price discrimination increases with competition in the airline market. Using a large cross section of tickets offered by several carriers on various routes, we approximate price discrimination with marginal implicit prices of ticket restrictions that carriers typically use to price discriminate: Saturday-night stayover re-quirements and advanced-purchase discounts. We find that the restrictions are associated with lower airfares, but that the discounts are smaller on routes with higher market concentration. The results suggest that price dispersion attributed to ticket restrictions increases as markets becomemore competitive.

Entry and exit literature focuses almost exclusively on firm-level decisions, leaving out an important aspect of firm behavior: whether to introduce new models while the firm produces similar goods and where to locate them in the existing product space, taking into account own models and the possibility of new entry. This paper analyzes model entry and exit decisions in the case of the personal computer market. Differences in new model spatial location between incumbents and entrants are found, while both model overpricing and firm reputation are found to be significant in the probability of model's exit estimation.