Using a new set of directly observed wage expectations among firms, this paper finds that in general firms' forecasts fail the unbiasedness and efficiency requirements of weak-form rational expectations. These market participants consistently underestimate the wages they actually end up paying, and their expectations do not efficiently utilize the information in past realizations. The mean absolute forecast error of two percent compares with an error of only five percent if static expectations were held. The major source of wage fore-cast error seems to be errors in predicting demand, rather than in predicting supply or the general price level. Wage forecast errors are positively correlated across fields with distinct supply patterns, and are positively correlated with quantity forecast error. The properties of stochastically weighted expectations and the effectiveness of the wage and price controls of the early 1970's are also discussed.

We test for customer discrimination with data from more than 800 retail stores employing over 70,000 individuals matched to census data on the demographics of each store's community. While our tests detect some increase in sales when the workforce more closely resembles potential customers, the effects we find are modest in magnitude. Customer discrimination is neither strong nor pervasive. We find little payoff to matching employee demographics to those of potential customers except when the customers do not speak English.