The gains and losses to factors of production from trade are discussed primarily within the context of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem which focuses on factor rewards. But policy makers are more concerned about employment effects of trade. This paper focuses on the short-run effects of trade on the incidence of layoffs in U.S. manufacturing industries. A probit model with endogenous switching is employed to estimate the effects of trade shocks and explore the role of comparative advantage on layoffs. The evidence suggests that trade shocks play a minor role in the incidence of layoff spells. However, net importing industries tend to adjust their labor force through layoffs to a greater extent than net exporting industries.

Recently developed methods in the analysis and measurement of latent factor models for time series are utilised to study international business cycles and their relationship to international stockmarket price behaviour. An advantage of these methods is that the duality properties between time domain and frequency domain approaches for investigating the properties of time series can be exploited to identify and model business cycles. The empirical results show that the six countries studied, which include the United States, Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, Germany and Japan, exhibit coherent national business cycles, although these cycles are not all alike. It is also found that international coherence in economic activity has increased in the flexible exchange rate period, although it is not as strong as it is for the national business cycles. The coherence between stockmarket prices and business cycles is not strong, both nationally and internationally, but international stockmarkets appear to show greater mutual coherence than do the corresponding economies.

We examine evidence on omitted-ability bias in estimates of the economic return to schooling, using proxies for unobserved ability. We consider measurement error in these ability proxies and the potential endogeneity of both experience and schooling, and examine wages at labor market entry and later. Including ability proxies reduces the estimate of the return to schooling, and instrumenting for these proxies reduces the estimated return still further. Instrumenting for schooling leads to considerably higher estimates of the return to schooling, although only for wages at labor market entry. This estimated return generally reverts to being near (although still above) the OLS estimate if we allow experience to be endogenous. In contrast, for observations at least a few years after labor market entry, the evidence indicates that OLS estimates of the return to schooling that ignore omitted ability are, if anything, biased upward rather than downward.

Hostile takeovers may reduce the prevalence of long-term employment contracts if they facilitate the opportunistic expropriation of extramarginal wage payments. Our tests of two versions of the expropriation hypothesis improve on existing research by using firm- and establishment-level data from an employer salary survey, and by performing both ex ante and ex post tests. First, we study the relationship between proxies for extramarginal wage payments and subsequent hostile takeover activity, and find little evidence of an expropriation motive. Then. since we observe wage and employment structures both before and after takeovers. we investigate whether proxies for extramarginal wages drop after hostile takeovers. The ex post experiments provide evidence consistent with one version of the expropriation hypothesis. In particular, such takeovers appear to reduce extramarginal wage payments to more-tenured workers, mostly through flattening wage-seniority profiles in firms with relatively senior work forces.

The effects of various regulations on hospital costs are estimated using a two decade long panel data set which spans the initiation, and in some instances the repeal, of various forms of hospital regulation. The long panel fosters two improvements over previous research. First, as state hospital cost levels may affect states' incentive to regulate, fixed effect estimators alleviate omitted variable bias derived from the states' regulatory discretion. Second, the long panel permits the estimation of many different regulatory program effects, but also facilitates the analysis of potential regulatory program interaction. The empirical results suggest that previous studies have exaggerated regulatory cost savings: although some interaction effects are indicated, hospital costs appear unresponsive to most regulatory programs.