From 1940 to 1990, a 10% increase in a metropolitan area's concentration of college-educated residents was associated with a 0.8% increase in subsequent employment growth. Instrumental variables estimates support a causal relationship between college graduates and employment growth, but show no evidence of an effect of high school graduates. Using data on growth in wages, rents, and house values, I calibrate a neoclassical city growth model and find that roughly 60% of the employment growth effect of college graduates is due to enhanced productivity growth, the rest being caused by growth in the quality of life. This finding contrasts with the common argument that human capital generates employment growth in urban areas solely through changes in productivity.

This paper reports on another attempt to statistically uncover evidence of embodied technological change as an explanation of changes in labor productivity in the United States. In this version of the test, an interregional cross-section, time-series sample of data was used. While the hypothesis has a lot of appeal, it has proven difficult to find manifestations of embodiment in econometric tests. This study has proven to be no exception. Despite the unique data set, results were again not supportive of the hypothesis. A possible limitation of this test is that the time period studied may have been too short. REFERENCES

We showed 10-second, silent video clips of unfamiliar gubernatorial debates to a group of experimental participants and asked them to predict the election outcomes. The participants' predictions explain more than 20 percent of the variation in the actual two-party vote share across the 58 elections in our study, and their importance survives a range of controls, including state fixed effects. In a horse race of alternative forecasting models, participants' forecasts significantly outperform economic variables in predicting vote shares, and are comparable in predictive power to a measure of incumbency status. Participants' forecasts seem to rest on judgments of candidates' personal attributes (such as likeability), rather than inferences about candidates' policy positions. Though conclusive causal inference is not possible in our context, our findings may be seen as suggestive evidence of a causal effect of candidate appeal on election outcomes.

We measure trends in affective polarization in twelve OECD countries over the past four decades. According to our baseline estimates, the United States experienced the largest increase in polarization over this period. Five countries experienced a smaller increase in polarization. Six countries experienced a decrease in polarization. We relate trends in polarization to trends in potential explanatory factors.