We construct and run an experiment to test the most basic choice effect predicted by salience theory. Subjects allocate wealth between a risky and a safe investment. While we vary an apparent payoff ratio to influence salience, treatments have economically equivalent consequences. Most other theories of behavior then predict zero effect. Our experimental findings are strongly consistent with the behavioral implication of a continuous version of salience theory. We provide a novel structural estimate on the strength of salience. In our setting, increasing the relative payoff contrast by 1% is equivalent to an increased odds ratio by about 0.4%.

This paper shows that replacing paper-based records with electronic medical records (EMRs) improves HIV patient retention and prevents AIDS deaths in the low-income country of Malawi. An event study of 106 HIV clinics shows a 28 percent reduction in annual deaths five years after EMR implementation, with the greatest impact on children. Improvements in health outcomes appear due to efficiency gains, rather than to changes in the medical care provided at visits. These efficiency gains allow clinics to better manage patient data, trace lapsed patients and return them into care, and adapt to higher patient volumes over time.

Recently, mandatory pension contributions in Iceland were increased substantially in the private sector while remaining unchanged in the public sector. Taking this as a large natural experiment, this paper studies the effects of this change on households’ voluntary saving, using comprehensive third-party reported information on income, assets, and debt for all taxpayers. Using difference-in-differences, we find that households do not reduce voluntary saving when faced with a rise in mandatory saving. Our results are supported by an event study of workers switching from the private sector to the public sector. Survey evidence suggests widespread ignorance about the pension system.

Platform-based information sharing among competing firms presents challenges for antitrust authorities, yet effective remedies remain unclear. Drawing inspiration from the Informed Sources retail gasoline antitrust case, we develop a theoretical model that offers policy guidance for disrupting anticompetitive coordination facilitated through price-sharing platforms. Removing only one firm from a platform may be ineffective for disrupting such coordination. However, competitive benefits can emerge if (i) at least two firms lack platform access, and (ii) the costs of price leadership are sufficiently high. More broadly, coordinating price increases becomes more difficult when multiple firms cannot quickly observe or respond to rivals' prices.