A presidential vote function and a presidential approval ratings function are jointly estimated for U.S. post-war observations. The estimation technique treats the two equations as seemingly unrelated regressions with unequal numbers of observations. Cross-equation restrictions implying that voters and poll respondents use identical standards in judging the economic performance of incumbents are imposed and tested. Estimates show that both votes and approval ratings are influenced by GNP growth and inflation. The results suggest that poll respondents are more inflation averse than voters; however, tests of this hypothesis are not conclusive.

The nature and characteristics of economic fluctuations in Eastern European Centrally Planned Economies are analyzed. When cycles are identified by the deviation from a fitted deterministic trend, they are seen to coincide temporally. This common variation is found for Net Material Product (NMP) and Investment. The implications of the common variation of CPE cycles are discussed. Possible explanations of this phenomenon are discussed with emphasis on a possible link via trade. We then examine the possibility that the time series contain unit roots. We are unable to reject this hypothesis for the variables in question. This suggests using procedures for detrending nonstationary time series suggested by Beveridge and Nelson. Such an analysis is performed and the implications are discussed. We find that there remains some common variation in the cyclical component of output, but to a lesser extent. The implications of these findings for future research on CPE cycles are discussed.

Henry W. Herzog, Jr., Alan M. Schlottmann, Valuing Risk in the Workplace: Market Price, Willingness to Pay, and the Optimal Provision of Safety, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Aug., 1990), pp. 463-470

Non-cooperative bidding theory for sealed-bid auctions generally implies testable predictions that are conditioned on the risk attitudes of agents. Received laboratory experiments that purport to test this theory do not generally control for the risk attitudes of subjects. Those experiments exhibit behavior inconsistent with popular bidding models that assume that agents have the same aversion to risk or are all risk neutral. This paper constructs an explicit Bayesian prior distribution for the risk attitudes of experimental subjects and reconsiders the experimental results. It finds that observed bidding behavior is still inconsistent with the Nash predictions when explicit prior weights are attached to alternative assumptions about subject risk attitudes. Thus one cannot account for observed bidding anomalies by appealing to uncontrolled nuisance variables such as risk attitudes. Non-cooperative bidding theory for sealed-bid auctions generally implies testable predictions that are conditioned on the risk attitudes of agents. Archetypical of this result is the Nash Equilibrium prediction for First Price auctions for an object that is valued by agents in an independent and private manner. Received laboratory experiments that purport to test this theory do not generally control for the risk attitudes of subjects. Those experiments exhibit behavior inconsistent with popular bidding models that assume that agents have the same aversion to riskor are all risk neutral. In this paper we construct an explicit prior distrlbution for the risk attitudes of experimental subjects and reconsider the experimental results. We find that observed bidding behavior is indeed consistent with the Nash predictions when explicit prior weights are attached to alternative assumptions about subject risk aversion. However, when one allows for risk loving subjects as well, observed behavior is inconsistent with Nash predictions. Thus one cannot account for observed bidding anomalies by appealing to uncontrolled nuisance variables such as risk attitudes. In section I we consider a specific Nash Equilibrium (NE) bidding model due to Cox, Roberson and Smith (1982) and Cox, Smith and Walker (1988) that clearly illustrates the risk-sensitivity of the theoretical predictions. In section II we provide independent evidence of the risk attitudes of experimental subjects in a test for risk attitudes developed by Harrison (1986a). This evidence allows us to construct an explicit prior probability density function over the coefficient of (constant relative) risk attitudes employed in the specific bidding model of section I. In section III we reconsider the evidence from the First Price (FP) experiments reported in Cox, Roberson and Smith (1982) and Cox, Smith and Walker (1983a, 1983b). I. A Specific Bidding Model Cox, Roberson and Smith (1982), hereafter CRS, present a model based on a power function utility specification for agent i: Ui(y) y= (1) Received for publication August 31, 1987. Revision accepted for publication December 18, 1989. * University of South Carolina. I am grateful to two anonymous referees for helpful comments, although they are not responsible for my conclusions.

Joseph V. Terza, Paul W. Wilson, Analyzing Frequencies of Several Types of Events: A Mixed Multinomial- Poisson Approach, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 72, No. 1 (Feb., 1990), pp. 108-115

A model of neighborhood turnover drawn from Bond and Coulson (1989) is proposed. The type of turnover process that is obtained is shown to depend mainly on the hedonic bid functions for housing and neighborhood quality. A demand system of four hedonic attributes is estimated. The main results are that the traditional model of filtering by age of unit does not occur and that filtering by housing size does. Tipping due to changes in median neighborhood income is also quite possible. Tipping through changes in racial composition appears less likely.