Knowledge that Transforms

M ORE statistical information on the industrial aspects of the American economy was collected by the War Production Board than had ever before been assembled in the history of this country. To mobilize our production resources for war, to insure that the products of mines and forests were utilized efficiently, to integrate materials and components into the greatest possible volume of finished products, and to channel the distribution of finished products to the military and export agencies and to the domestic civilian population in a manner most directly related to winning the war, the WPB assembled information in greater detail and covering shorter time periods than had ever been believed necessary. This mass of statistical information covers basic materials, semi-fabricated materials, components, sub-assemblies, finished end-items, productive capacity, and construction activity. It also includes related data on the materials required to produce fabricated items, the purposes for which the products are used, and the kinds of ultimate consumers who use them. To some extent, related statistics on employment are also available, but these data should not be regarded as a primary source for labor information. The available data do not cover prices, financial operations of reporting firms, or other economic aspects of the operations of industry not directly related to either production or distribution in a centrally-controlled economy. Two broad needs were fundamental to the collection of the data: (i) the need for providing comprehensive information essential to the formulation of basic policy in the war economy; and (2) the need for providing detailed information essential to the management of controlled production and distribution of individual items. Most of the data were collected to serve the latter purpose and were developed either through report forms designed to provide the background information on which action could be based, or on application forms on which the person, plant, or company desiring assistance supplied appropriate information in support of requests to facilitate the immediate action of the administrators. A total of almost 5,ooo different reporting and application forms were used by the WPB, its predecessors (the National Defense Advisory Commission and the Office of Production Management), and its successor (the Civilian Production Administration). This total of almost s,ooo forms should not be used as a measure of the magnitude of the reporting burden imposed upon American industry. Included in the total are many onetime requests for information which was frequently supplied by telephone, telegraph, or informal letter. About two-thirds of the forms which were given serial numbers fall into this category; most of the remaining were specialized requests for information, which covered a very narrow field of production or distribution, and required responses from a very small segment of American industry. In only a few cases were the requests for statistics continuous and widespread in their impact. At the beginning of the defense program, it was assumed that statistical information already collected by the federal government or by trade associations could be used as basic data in organizing production and controlling distribution. During this period efforts were made to supplement existing information by such devices as special requests for capacity data to be collected and assembled by state industrial councils, and for supply data on certain basic metals to be developed through associations representing metal producers. All through I940, those responsible for the administration of the research and statistical aspects of the defense program tried to stay within the

I904-I4,2 total new construction had two peaks, the first of which coincided with that of replacement and the second with that of new investment. The present study shows clearly that in the period here analyzed, as in the earlier period, replacement was leading in the business cycle. For this analysis, the life characteristics of first-ownerships for the years I932-39 were calculated according to actuarial methods. In the calculations the following symbols were used:

So far as unemployment in general is concerned, there is now agreement that most of the predictions for the reconversion period 'were too pessimistic. A few of the forecasts follow. In a report released by the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion three days after the surrender of Japan 3 it was stated: There will be 5 million or more unemployed in three months. By spring unemployment may reach about 8 In a research study published early in I945 by the Committee for Economic Development ' it was predicted that unemployment would probably reach a peak of at least 4 or 5 million workers during the transition, and that under adverse circumstances this total might approach iO or even I5 million. In a pamphlet, published in I943 by the Postwar Division of the Bureau of Labor Statistics,5 the following statement appears: If industry hesitates and delays the change-back to full-scale civilian production, unemployment may run up to I 2 million or more in half a year's time, whereas it may not go beyond 7 million subject to offsets by means of public works if management, labor, and government tackle our joint problems with real courage and intelligence. Actual unemployment estimates of the Bureau of the Census, covering the period July I945 to March I946, are given in Table i.