If firms issue convertible securities to facilitate sequential investment, the securities should be engineered to give sufficient flexibility to accommodate timing of follow‐on investment. We examine call provisions in convertible bonds and argue that firms with investment options expected to expire sooner (later) will offer weaker (stronger) call protection. We find that issues with weak or no call protection are offered by firms that invest greater amounts soon after issuance than those issuing convertibles with strong protection. Moreover, capital expenditure levels during the 5‐year period following issuance are inversely related to the length of call‐protection periods.

Robert Moore Fisher, Charles J. Siegman, Patterns of Housing Experience During Period of Credit Restraint in Industrialized Countries, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 27, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Thirtieth Annual Meeting of the American Finance Association, New Orleans, Louisiana, December 27-29, 1971 (May, 1972), pp. 193-205

Reviews the book "Accounting Systems in Modern Business," by Eldred A. Johnson.

The relationship between age-earnings profiles and worker incentives is examined by contrasting wage and salary workers with the self-employed. It is argued that the steepness of wage and salary workers' age-earnings profiles reflects the desire to provide work incentives to those workers. Since self-employed workers do not face this agency problem, they are used as a benchmark to gauge productivity. Empirical support of the proposition is provided, and the effects of human capital accumulation are separated empirically from incentive effects. The most important conclusion is that under some strong assumptions, most of the slope in age-earnings profiles is accounted for by the desire to provide incentives, rather than by on-the-job training.

The model developed has the unemployment rates of four classifications of teenagers and the unemployment rate of males twenty to twenty-five as a function of overall labor market conditions, the minimum wage as a proportion of average hourly earnings for nonfarm workers, and the coverage of the minimum wage. The model hypothesizes that changes in the minimum wage relative to average hourly earning have an increasing effect as employers gain more time to adjust; consequently a distributed lag is used to measure the impact of the minimum wage. As might be expected, the minimum wage most adversely affected nonwhite teenagers; females sixteen to nineteen were more adversely affected than males.

It was conjectured by Pigou that an increase in real national income, as reckoned in the prices of either the initial or the terminal period, would always correctly indicate an improvement in national welfare provided the increase referred to the aggregate income of a given group of persons with fixed preferences and a fixed proportional distribution of income among them. We show that if the individual preferences are assumed to be homothetic, and if by a welfare improvement one means respectively a potential improvement (in which losers can be compensated by gainers) or an actual improvement (in which all are gainers), then on either of these respective criteria Pigou's conjecture holds true under these conditions if and only if individual preferences are identical.