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Robust HPD Regions in Bayesian Regression Models

Econometrica 1991 59(6), 1581
A Bayesian analysis of the linear regression model with only parts of the prior distribution specified or a robust Bayesian analysis lead to sets of posterior distributions. E. E. Leamer (1978) describes the region of posterior means for conjugate priors and varying prior covariance matrices. As an extension to Bayesian confidence sets (HPD regions) the authors introduce the concept of HiFi (high fiduciary) regions. The Hifi region is a union of HPD regions and is a tool for describing the dependence of the posterior distribution on the prior covariance. The authors assume that the prior covariance matrix varies in an interval of matrices. Copyright 1991 by The Econometric Society.

Aggregation and Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem

Econometrica 1991 59(1), 1
A celebrated result of Black (1948a) demonstrates the existence of a simple-majority winner when preferences are single-peaked. The social choice follows the preferences of the median voter: the median voter's most-preferred outcome beats any alternative. However, this conclusion does not extend to elections in which candidates differ in more than one dimension. This paper provides a multi-dimensional analog of the median voter result. We provide conditions under which the mean voter's most preferred outcome is unbeatable according to a 64%-majority rule. The conditions supporting this result represent a significant generalization of Caplin and Nalebuff (1988). The proof of our mean voter result uses a mathematical aggregation theorem due to Prekopa (1971, 1973) and Borell (1975). This theorem has broad applications in economics. An application to the distribution of income is described at the end of this paper; results on imperfect competition are presented in the companion paper, Caplin and Nalebuff (1991).

Evolutionary Games in Economics

Econometrica 1991 59(3), 637
Evolutionary games are introduced as models for repeated anonymous strategic interaction.The basic idea is that actions (or behaviors) which are more "fit," given the current distribution of behaviors, tend over time to displace less fit behaviors.Simple numerical examples motivate the key concepts of fitness function and compatible dynamics, and illustrate the relation to previous biological models.Cone fields are introduced to characterize the continuous-time dynamical processes compatible with a given fitness function.The analysis focuses on dynamic steady state equilibria and their relation to the static equilibria known as NE (Nash equilibrium) and ESS (evolutionary stable state).For large classes of dynamics it is shown that all stable dynamic steady states are NE and that all NE are dynamic steady states.The biologists' ESS condition is less closely related to the dynamic equilibria.The paper concludes with a brief survey of economic applications.

Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice

Econometrica 1991 59(4), 1023
A set of n objects and an amount M of money is to be distributed among m people. Example: the objects are tasks and the money is compensation from a fixed budget. An elementary argument via constrained optimization shows that for M sufficiently large the set of efficient, envy free allocations is nonempty and has a nice structure. In particular, various criteria of justice lead to unique best fair allocations that are well behaved with respect to changes of M. This is in sharp contrast to the usual fair division theory with divisible goods. Copyright 1991 by The Econometric Society.

Error Correction and Long-Run Equilibrium in Continuous Time

Econometrica 1991 59(4), 967
This paper deals with error correction models (ECM's) and cointegrated systems that are formulated in continuous time. Long-run equilibrium coefficients in the continuous system are always identified in the discrete time reduced form, so that there is no aliasing problem for these parameters. The long-run relationships are also preserved under quite general data filtering. Frequency domain procedures are outlined for estimation and inference. These methods are asymptotically optimal under Gaussian assumptions and they have the advantages of simplicity of computation and generality of specification, thereby avoiding some methodological problems of dynamic specification. In addition, they facilitate the treatment of data irregularities such as mixed stock and flow data and temporally aggregated partial equilibrium formulations. Models with restricted cointegrating matrices are also considered.