Knowledge that Transforms

MODELS OF ECONOMIES with land used by urban economists often employ assumptions that are inappropriate for the commodity known as land (see Berliant [3]). It is therefore natural to attempt to formulate a model that does not suffer from this drawback. In particular, a framework with a finite number of consumers trading in measurable subsets of land (rather than densities or points) is constructed below. The purpose of the present study is to examine the preference relations and utilities used in this type of framework. Problems arise in generating utility representations of preference relations because the separability property of a oX-algebra (on a set of possibly infinite measure) endowed with the L' topology on indicator functions of elements of the a-algebra is not obvious. Let (L, A, m) be a nonatomic measure space with L a separable metric space, A its Borel v-algebra, and m regular and positive. Generally, script letters will represent subsets of $ while capital letters will represent elements of $. If A Be , define A/B=xc L xc A, xiB. For example, L could be a measurable subset of R2, $ the c-algebra of all measurable subsets of L, and m Lebesgue measure restricted to L. The set L is then a representation of land in that anything immobile can be embedded in L, and consumers have complete preorderings over these immobile objects along with land through preference relations over subsets of L. There is no linear structure imposed on A. There are two reasons to consider all sets in A rather than only those with finite measure. First, it is natural to include L the totality of land, in the choice set of each agent of the example. Second, it is convenient to embed indicator functions of elements of $ in L' (see Bewley [6]), and completeness of the space requires that sets of infinite measure be included. Berliant [4] uses utility functions on L' to prove existence of an equilibrium in an economy with land. Next, a topology is imposed on A. Let the basis for the topology be given by T=$2cAi j9=BcX 3jAcBccC m(B\A)>O wm(C\B)>O for A, Cc X, Ac C, m(C\A)>O, m(A) O for Cc$A openu$c9X |2 =Bc$91| A'B. m(B\A)> O for A c $ compact, m(A) <oo. Thus, basis elements consist of subsets of $ that can be trapped (in a set containment sense) between various

On considere des equations autoregressives a variables exogenes et un terme de bruit blanc normal, ce qui generalise les modeles dynamiques etudies precedemment

[This paper studies the pricing of common stocks in the context of a monetary, rational expectations equilibrium. Special attention is given to the relationship between inflation and asset returns.]

in this paper we specify and estimate a structural limited dependent variable model with which we study both the health and retirement status of the elderly.Standard linear estimators, which assume that these variables are continuous, are not appropriate and categorical estimation techniques are preferred.Our model differs from previous work in that we have longitudinal data and random effects that are correlated over time for different individuals.The problem is made more complicated because there is sample truncation, which could potentially bias coefficient estimates, since approximately twenty percent of the individuals in our sample die.We outline the full information maximum likelihood estimator for such a model and implement it in our empirical analysis.With our structural estimates we analyze, among other things, the degree to which endogeneously determined health status affects the probability of retirement and how changes in social security benefits and eligibility for transfer payments modify both healthiness and the demand for leisure.

This paper considers multistage games with communication mechanisms that can be implemented by a central mediator. In a communication equilibrium, no player expects ex ante to gain by manipulating his reports or actions. A sequential communication equilibrium is a communication equilibrium with a conditional probability system under which no player could ever expect to gain by manipulation, even after zero-probability events. Codominated actions are defined. It is shown that a communication equilibrium is a sequential communication equilibrium if and only if it never uses codominated actions. Predominant communication equilibria are defined by iterative elimination of codominated actions and are shown to exist.

[We consider a revenue maximizing server who has the opportunity to suppress information on actual queue length, leaving demanders to decide on joining the queue on the basis of the known distribution of waiting times. We address the following second best problem: If suppression, but not pricing, can be socially controlled, is it socially optimal to prevent suppression? We show that it may be, but is not always, socially optimal to prevent suppression and that it is never optimal to encourage suppression when the revenue maximizer prefers to reveal the queue length.]

[This paper investigates whether agents can learn how to form rational expectations using standard econometric techniques in the case of a linear stochastic supply and demand model with a production lag. This model has a unique rational expectations equilibrium in which the expected price is a linear function of an observable exogenous random variable. Outside of rational expectations equilibrium agents predict the price by using a regression of past prices on the exogenous random variable where the regression is estimated by either ordinary least squares or Bayesian methods. If the agents are Bayesians, they may have diverse prior beliefs on the mean of the estimated parameter, but all have the same precision. This estimation procedure would be appropriate for an outside observer estimating the parameters of the model in rational expectations equilibrium the coefficient of the equation relating the mathematical conditional expectation of the price to the exogenous variable is constant through time. Outside rational expectations equilibrium this coefficient, which changes each time new data change the regression coefficient. The data are generated by a time-varying parameter model where the varying parameter is determined by past data and the estimation procedure. Agents fail to take this feedback into account and so are estimating a misspecific model.]

Donald W. K. Andrews, A Note on the Unbiasedness of Feasible GLS, Quasi-Maximum Likelihood, Robust, Adaptive, and Spectral Estimators of the Linear Model, Econometrica, Vol. 54, No. 3 (May, 1986), pp. 687-698