Knowledge that Transforms

Is there a role for governments in emerging countries to accelerate economic development by intervening in product and factor markets? To address this question, we study optimal dynamic Ramsey policies in a standard growth model with financial frictions. The optimal policy intervention involves pro-business policies like suppressed wages in early stages of the transition, resulting in higher entrepreneurial profits and faster wealth accumulation. This, in turn, relaxes borrowing constraints in the future, leading to higher labor productivity and wages. In the long run, optimal policy reverses sign and becomes pro-worker. In a multi-sector extension, optimal policy subsidizes sectors with a latent comparative advantage and, under certain circumstances, involves a depreciated real exchange rate. Our results provide an efficiency rationale, but also identify caveats, for many of the development policies actively pursued by dynamic emerging economies.

Before completing merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions, acquiring firms conduct due diligence. This process provides acquiring firms with a more informed assessment of the expected costs, benefits, and risks of an acquisition and offers one last opportunity to renegotiate or terminate an M&A transaction. However, acquiring firms must trade off the costs and benefits of performing additional due diligence versus completing the acquisition. Based on an analysis of the time to negotiate the acquisition agreement and complete the transaction, I predict and find that competitive pressures, short‐term financial reporting incentives, and agency problems are associated with less due diligence. I also find that less due diligence is associated with lower post‐acquisition profitability, a higher probability of acquisition‐related goodwill impairments, and lower quality fair value estimates for the acquired assets and liabilities. These findings highlight due diligence as an important factor explaining cross‐sectional variation in post‐acquisition performance and financial reporting for business combinations.

We investigate the effect of executives and directors with prior banking crisis experience on bank outcomes around the global financial crisis (GFC). Executives and directors with previous experience leading banks through a bank crisis may have been uniquely able to understand the risks, recognize the warnings signs early, and thus respond more effectively to the GFC. Controlling for other executive, director, and bank‐level characteristics, we examine whether bank performance, risk taking, and accounting quality in the period immediately before and during the GFC are affected by having executives or directors who previously served as bank executives or directors during the 1980s/1990s banking crisis (80s/90s crisis). Overall, we find that banks led by these crisis‐experienced executives and directors exhibit stronger performance, lower risk taking, and higher accounting quality in the period around the GFC. These effects are strongest among bank leaders for whom the 80s/90s crisis was most salient. Results are robust to propensity‐matched samples and other analyses performed to rule out alternative explanations. Our results suggest these individuals were able to learn from prior crisis experience.

We examine the stock price impact of corporate site visits using a unique data set of site visits to listed firms in China. Our main findings are as follows. First, the market reaction around corporate site visits is statistically and economically significant and is stronger for group visits, visits conducted by mutual fund managers, visits covering accounting and finance topics, visits to firms with poor information environments, and visits to manufacturing firms. Second, the stock returns around site visits are positively associated with firms’ future performance. Third, the changes in visiting funds’ holdings are more predictive of firms’ future performance than those of nonvisiting funds. Overall, this study contributes to the literature by providing evidence that site visits are important venues for investors to collect information about firms and make informed trades.

This paper provides new evidence on whether and how boards solve costly ex post settling up to recover CEO cash compensation for unrealized gains that fail to materialize. Our analyses are motivated by the likely expanding role for ex post settling up as the risk of compensating executives for unrealized gains that may never materialize increases in a more intangibles‐based economy, as well as by the conflicting evidence of prior research. We provide evidence consistent with ex post settling up by (i) using alternative truncation methods to derive observations most likely to fall within the theoretically motivated incentive zone; (ii) replicating and reconciling the conflicting results of prior research that supports (Leone et al. 2006) and fails to support (Shaw and Zhang 2010) ex post settling up; (iii) using Incentive Lab data with contract‐specific information, allowing strong identification of observations in the incentive zone; and (iv) documenting predictable cross‐sectional variation, with ex post settling up being more pronounced for firms with stronger corporate governance, less conservative accounting earnings, and a larger proportion of total pay in the form of cash compensation. Overall, we conclude that evidence is strong in support of the ex post settling up hypothesis.

This article investigates the impact of political uncertainty on contractual lending terms using a large sample of syndicated loans and a within-firm estimation approach to achieve identification. Firms pay 7 basis points (bps) more on loans originated when their lenders are undergoing an election relative to when their lenders are not undergoing an election. Lenders from less financially developed countries are more likely to pass political uncertainty costs to borrowers. Consistent with electoral uncertainty driving this premium, the most contested elections have the largest impact (17 bps). Overall, political uncertainty leads to a tangible increase in firms’ financing costs.

Firms’ reluctance at times to publicly disclose financial information is often attributed to concern that the information may be used against them by self‐interested outside parties. These outside parties may interact with the firm in the horizontal realm (e.g., retail competitors) or in the vertical arena (e.g., wholesale suppliers). This article is built on the premise that fully understanding the strategic consequences of disclosure requires joint consideration of horizontal and vertical relationships. When both rivals and suppliers are accounted for, we demonstrate that (i) lower intra‐industry correlation in product demand favors disclosure, with the precise correlation‐cutoff dependent on the firm's use of input suppliers; and (ii) the more a firm relies on input suppliers with pricing power, the less attractive is disclosure.

This study investigates whether task interdependence in teams alters the effectiveness of managerial discretion in motivating team performance. Teams are particularly useful when employees' tasks are interdependent—that is, when the degree to which the increase in team performance resulting from a team member's effort depends on the effort and skills of the other team members. The reason is that the more interdependent tasks are, the more employees need to coordinate their actions and help one another to achieve their objectives. Prior research analyzing settings where task interdependence is absent suggests that providing managers with discretion over team bonus allocation can improve team performance relative to equal team bonus allocations because it strengthens the link between contributions to team output and rewards. Economic theory suggests that managerial discretion will also improve team performance when task interdependence is present and information is efficiently used. However, we use behavioral theory to predict that managerial discretion is less effective in the presence of task interdependence, because managers do not fully incorporate all relevant information into bonus decisions and because managerial discretion hurts coordination and helping, which is particularly problematic under task interdependence. We find that while discretion over compensation has a positive effect on team performance relative to equal bonus allocation when task interdependence is absent, it has a negative effect when task interdependence is present. Additional analyses provide support for our underlying theory. Results of our study contribute to both theory and practice by suggesting that, ironically, managerial discretion may be most useful when the potential benefits of employing teams are lowest and least useful when the potential benefits are highest. Our results help explain why firms often grant managers only partial or no discretion over team members' compensation.

This study examines whether and how linguistic information quality (measured by readability) of customer firms' management earnings forecast reports (MEFRs) affects supplier firms' investment quality (measured by investment efficiency). Our analyses reveal that supplier investment efficiency is positively associated with the average linguistic information quality of customers' prior MEFRs, and the positive association between supplier investment efficiency and customer MEFRs' numerical information quality is stronger in supplier firms with more readable customer MEFRs. Our analyses also reveal that higher linguistic information quality of customer MEFRs improves the monitoring of supplier firms by their outside stakeholders, such as institutional investors and financial analysts, and ameliorates the negative impact of suppliers' customer‐dependence on their investment efficiency. Our results suggest that greater linguistic information quality of a customer firm's forward‐looking disclosures is associated with higher‐quality investments made by its suppliers along the supply chain.

The SEC's Disclosure Effectiveness Initiative (December 2013) highlights a difference between accounting regulators and academics in their perceptions of Item 1A risk factor disclosure effectiveness. Because most academic evidence relies on pre‐financial crisis data, we compare changes in risk factor disclosure informativeness before and after the crisis as a possible explanation for this disconnect. We further explore this discrepancy by considering (i) three classes of market participants, (ii) new, discontinued, and repeated disclosures, and (iii) nonmarket outcomes. Our results confirm previous findings but indicate that those results no longer hold in the subsequent period. Specifically, we find that although equity, option, and bond markets react to unexpected risk factor disclosures in the period leading up to the financial crisis (2006–2008), the market reactions decline significantly in the post‐crisis period (2009–2014). Perhaps surprisingly, the documented changes in informativeness are not driven by disclosures repeated from one year to the next but instead result from new disclosures initiated in the current year and, in the option and debt markets, also from disclosures discontinued from the previous year. Finally, using the Altman Z ‐score as an objective bankruptcy risk measure, we find that the association between risk factor disclosures and companies’ future bankruptcy risk declines significantly in the post financial crisis period. Taken together, these findings contribute to the current disclosure effectiveness debate by highlighting that risk factor disclosures, which were informative in the preceding period, become less reflective of the underlying economic risks and thus less informative to investors in the post‐crisis period. La déclaration des facteurs de risque est‐elle toujours pertinente ? Données tirées des réactions du marché à la déclaration des facteurs de risque avant et après la crise financière