Knowledge that Transforms

ABSTRACT We document controlling shareholder (insider) opportunism in an insolvency regime that uses an accounting rule to determine bankruptcy eligibility. Our study sheds light on managerial incentives induced by weak investor protection laws. Using unique data on bankrupt firms from an emerging market, consistent with our prediction, we show insiders intentionally manage earnings downward to understate firm net worth so as to be able to file for bankruptcy. Downward pre‐bankruptcy earnings management is associated with more payments to insiders and weaker performance, post‐filing. A battery of tests suggests our results cannot be fully explained as an artifact of financial distress. Rather, they are consistent with insiders exploiting weak investor protection to extract private benefits at the expense of lenders and outside shareholders. Our study serves as a cautionary tale for all insolvency regimes that use a balance sheet test in an environment with weak creditor protection.

ABSTRACT The current biodiversity loss is dramatic. Over the past 50 years, more than 68% of the mammals, birds, amphibians, reptiles, and fish on Earth have disappeared, putting the planet's survival and its inhabitants—including human beings—at risk. Financialization, or the transformation of nature into financial assets, is increasingly proposed as a solution to the biodiversity crisis. Proponents of financialization believe that assigning a monetary value to nature will incentivize human beings to protect habitats and their species. This article offers a four‐mechanism model of nature's financialization, explaining why it is virtually impossible to financialize nature. We collected data through a unique two‐stage data collection process, including a single case study and additional interviews with conservationists and conservation finance specialists. We analyzed the development of a calculative device, the “Index,” designed to assess the impact of conservation efforts on the survival of endangered species. Conservationists hoped to use the Index to calculate the financial return of a conservation impact bond, a financial instrument designed to finance conservation projects. However, they did not achieve their goal. We discuss the implications for the financialization and conservation literature and the role of accounting therein. We notably question previous accounts of financialization, including the need for financial numbers or financial actors. We ultimately show that a financialization project can transform practices toward financialization, even if the financialization process is not complete.

I examine how changes in analysts' workloads affect their information production. Examining determinants of analysts' information production is important because analyst research affects stock prices and capital allocation decisions. Using periods when analysts work on IPOs to proxy for shocks to their workloads, I predict and find that the accuracy, quantity, and timeliness of analysts' forecasts for non‐IPO firms decline when they are working on IPOs, and they herd closer to the consensus. The reductions in research quality are larger for less experienced analysts, larger IPOs, and less important portfolio firms. Last, I predict and find that information asymmetry increases for non‐IPO firms covered by analysts who are working on IPOs, consistent with analysts' reduction in research quality during IPO assignments negatively affecting the information environment of non‐IPO firms. In sum, I provide the first evidence that analysts' work on IPO deals imposes negative externalities on both the quality of research they produce for the non‐IPO firms they cover and the information environments of these firms, highlighting at least one reason why analyst workload is important to firms and investors.

ABSTRACT We design three experiments to examine how group incentives moderate the motivational effects of cash versus tangible rewards. Our first experiment shows that, relative to individual incentives, group incentives can magnify any negative effect of the uncertain attractiveness of a less‐fungible tangible reward (versus cash), as group members must evaluate not only how attractive they find the reward themselves but also how attractive other group members are likely to find it. However, as we show in our second experiment, under group incentives, structuring a tangible reward as a shared experience among group members who like each other can mitigate any demotivating effect of an individually consumed tangible reward vis‐à‐vis a cash reward. A third experiment provides process support for our theory, showing that both the attractiveness of the reward and the degree of certainty that others will also find it attractive jointly and fully mediate our findings. As a whole, our study furthers an understanding of the multifaceted dimensions of tangible rewards, identifying incremental effects that can arise when tangible rewards are combined with group incentives.

ABSTRACT Researchers typically infer real earnings management when a firm's operating and investing activities differ from industry norms. A significant problem with classifying deviations from industry averages as myopic earnings management is that companies can change their operating and investing decisions for strategic business reasons rather than to mislead stakeholders. Using principal components analysis, we systematically evaluate existing measures and develop a comprehensive real activities measure to better capture earnings manipulation. Our measure reflects (i) deviations from industry averages across multiple activities and (ii) other signals of manipulation. This approach is promising because, although there are many sources of abnormal activities, manipulation is more likely the cause when managers engage in multiple income‐increasing abnormal activities that coincide with other signals that indicate an elevated risk of manipulation. This simple approach results in a metric that associates negatively with future operating performance and earnings persistence, yields high‐power tests, and captures manipulation reasonably well across most life‐cycle stages. Importantly, this approach performs better than the standard real earnings management metrics across all dimensions. Specifically, it generates the expected reduction in future earnings and reduced earnings persistence in 82% of the tests compared to 36% and 46% in common alternatives. Also, because this innovation does not require a long time‐series or rely on future period realizations for classification, it can be useful in more research settings than other recent innovations in the literature.

ABSTRACT The rise of stakeholder governance has triggered a wave of legal initiatives to strengthen the employee voice in firms. However, how managers trade off the competing objectives between shareholders and employees when making financial reporting decisions is not well understood. Exploiting staggered employment protection laws (EPLs) across 26 countries, we find that managers facing strong EPLs report more opaque earnings. Exploring the mechanism, we show that EPLs induce manager‐employee alliance: EPLs enhance employees' power to influence managers' private benefits and create an incentive for managers to treat employees more favorably, leading to an increase in manager‐employee reciprocal benefits. Further analysis shows that the alliance drives the increase in opacity following EPLs. Such alliance‐induced opacity impedes the ability of institutional shareholders to make timely adjustments to portfolio holdings in response to EPLs. Last, we identify several governance mechanisms that help break the manager‐employee nexus and restore reporting transparency. Overall, our study documents manager‐employee alliance as a potential cost of rigid labor laws and an important source of managerial reporting bias.

ABSTRACT This study examines the interplay between tax and internal reporting incentives among affiliates of multinational corporations (MNCs). MNCs face limited information flows that may prevent affiliates' performance metrics to be responsive immediately to changes in the firm's tax planning. Using granular data of affiliates belonging to MNCs from 21 European countries, our study provides new empirical evidence of affiliate internal reporting responses induced by changing tax plans. When high‐tax‐rate countries tighten income shifting rules, we first document that income shifting is reduced and low‐tax‐rate affiliates have less income. Second, we predict and document that managers of these low‐tax‐rate affiliates offset this decrease in profits by managing upwards a key performance metric: affiliate earnings. Our results are consistent with firms not quickly adjusting the affiliate managers' incentives in the face of changing tax planning strategies, and affiliates managing reported earnings to offset the effect of changes in the tax planning of the firm. Cross‐sectional analyses provide further evidence consistent with the theory underlying the main tests. The results support the policy of tightening income shifting rules when the objective is to reduce income shifting, and firms' central management would benefit from considering the implications of changing tax plans on the assessment of local managers.

ABSTRACT We investigate how owners of small‐ and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs) perceive, make sense of, and practice risk management. Drawing on Schatzki's practice theory, we theorize on how and why risk management happens in SMEs. Thus, we fill a gap in the extant literature, which focuses almost exclusively on risk management within large organizations. We interview entrepreneurs and conduct site observations to gain insight into their risk management activities, the drivers that lead to the adoption of said activities, their attitudes toward risk management, and how their accountants may shape and contribute to risk management in SMEs. We find that rather than a specific set of formal processes, entrepreneurs view risk management as a mindset that emphasizes the preservation of key assets, creation of competitive advantages, and development of local talent and expertise. We observe practices that are mainly informal yet planned, deliberate, and fully integrated within the fabric of organizations that align with ideal forms of risk management. We also find that full‐time, in‐house accountants do help entrepreneurs with risk management, while external accountants, whose main activities relate to financial statement preparation and tax filings, do not systematically help entrepreneurs manage risk. We contribute to both the theory and practice of risk management by sharing empirical insights into how SME owners perceive, make sense of, and manage risk.

ABSTRACT We examine how regulatory restrictions on capital market activity affect the compensation contracting environment within firms. This study aims to expand our understanding of how financial market development affects firm risk‐taking via management compensation designs. Specifically, taking advantage of the staggered implementation of the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA), which increases bank competition and loan geographical diversification, this study examines how borrowing firms' compensation structures change when banks increase risk tolerance in their loan portfolios. Using hand‐collected compensation data of firms with market capitalization less than $75 million, we hypothesize and find that borrowing firms are likely to increase risk incentives after IBBEA and that this increase is more pronounced for firms located in states with less banking competition in the pre‐IBBEA period. We also show the findings to be more significant for borrowers whose lenders acquire more diversification benefits after IBBEA. These findings suggest that following deregulation, when banks face increased competition as well as an enhanced ability to diversify their credit risk geographically, these same banks tend to increase their tolerance for borrowers' risk‐taking. That is, their clients—nonfinancial firms borrowing from them—adjust their compensation contracts that are previously constrained by bank distaste for risk. We also document that firms that increase their risk incentives the most invest more in R&D, suggesting that management compensation is a complementary channel through which IBBEA affects firm innovation.

ABSTRACT This study examines the impact of cross‐firm financial statement comparability on regulatory oversight of accounting quality. Required to review each firm's periodic filings at least once every three years, the SEC learns about the degree to which a firm's accounting system is comparable to those of its peers. We posit that the SEC's ex ante knowledge about financial statement comparability, gleaned from prior‐year filing reviews, facilitates its evaluation of firms' accounting quality during the current‐year filing review. Consistent with the notion that comparable accounting systems enhance regulators' ability to identify discretionary accounting deviations, we find that the likelihood of the SEC issuing a comment letter for higher abnormal accruals increases with financial statement comparability. Further analysis reveals that the regulatory benefits from higher financial statement comparability are more salient when the SEC faces higher monitoring constraints in filing reviews. Moreover, our finding shows that comparable accounting numbers across firms help the SEC detect severe accounting violations that necessitate restatements. Overall, we provide novel evidence suggesting that higher financial statement comparability improves the efficacy of the SEC's oversight of accounting quality by reducing the information costs associated with cross‐firm comparisons.