Knowledge that Transforms

This paper examines how the allocation of authority within an organization affects workers’ incentives and performance, using personnel data from a Chinese newspaper. Relying on an authority change that transferred the right of making editorial decisions from midlevel editors to top editors in four of the eight divisions in the newspaper, I find that the authority change improves reporters’ performance while reducing their activities for private gain and decreases midlevel editors’ journalistic initiative. To reconcile these findings, a synthesis of two theories on authority and incentives—the vertical and the horizontal allocation of authority—is needed.

We study the effect of public subsidies from the Hill-Burton program on hospital capacity, organization of the hospital industry, and utilization. We estimate that the program accounted for a net increase of over 70,000 beds nationwide and that these effects lasted well beyond twenty years. We also show that differences in the number of hospital beds per capita between high- and low-income counties, rural and urban counties, and the South and the rest of the country fell substantially. We conclude that the program largely achieved its goals, with substantial and long-lasting effects on the U.S. hospital industry.

Quantity surcharges occur when retailers carry a product in two sizes and offer a promotion on the small size: the large size then costs more per unit than the small one. When quantity surcharges occur, sales of the large size decline only slightly even though the same quantity can be purchased for less. We document this behavior in two data sets and four product categories. It is consistent with the notion of passive shoppers found in the industrial organization literature and the notion of rational inattention in macroeconomics. We discuss implications for consumer decision making, demand estimation, and firm pricing.

Research as to the size of the black-white test score gap often comes to contradictory conclusions. Recent literature has affirmed that the source of these contradictions and other controversies in education economics may be due to the fact that test scores contain only ordinal information. In this paper, I propose a normalization of test scores that is invariant to monotonic transformations. Under fairly weak assumptions, this metric has interval properties and thus solves the ordinality problem. The measure can serve as a valuable robustness check to ensure that any results are not simply statistical artifacts from the choice of scale.

Decades of campaigns have cautioned households in Bangladesh about waterborne contaminants such as arsenic. In addition to switching water sources, mothers can protect young children from contaminated water by breastfeeding longer. We exploit time series variation in whether children were born before or after a nationwide information campaign and geographic variation in exposure to arsenic. We find that mothers breast-feed children longer in response to the campaign, especially when they have less access to uncontaminated wells, and that infants are more likely to be exclusively breast-fed. We find consistent evidence of lower mortality rates and diarrheal incidence for infants.

In the past twenty years, the share of top incomes in Switzerland has risen, while exhibiting large variations. Switzerland is similar to European countries for the top 1% but closer to the United States for higher top income groups. With the synthetic control method, we close a time gap in the tax data, exploiting the fact that Swiss cantons changed their tax system at different points in time. Using social security data, which cover all top labor incomes, we document the growing importance of labor compared to capital incomes among top income earners in Switzerland.

This paper introduces a new estimator for the fixed-effects ordered logit model. The proposed method has two advantages over existing estimators. First, it estimates the differences in the cut points along with the regression coefficient, leading to provide bounds on partial effects. Second, the proposed estimator for the regression coefficient is more efficient. I use the fact that the ordered logit model with J outcomes and T observations can be converted to a binary choice logit model in (J - 1)T ways. As an empirical illustration, I examine the income-health gradient for children using the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey.

We study a field experiment at a large technology company. Employees were encouraged to submit ideas on process and product improvements. The company randomly assigned nineteen teams into treatment and control groups. Treatment team employees received rewards if their ideas were approved. Nothing changed for control team employees. Our main finding is that rewards substantially increased the quality of ideas. Rewards increased participation in the suggestion system but decreased ideas per participating employee, with no net effect on the quantity of ideas. Broader participation persisted after the reward was discontinued, suggesting habituation. We find no evidence for motivational crowding out.

We provide the first evaluation of the effect of the U.S. minimum legal drinking age (MLDA) on nonfatal injuries. Using administrative records from several states and a regression discontinuity approach, we document that inpatient hospital admissions and emergency department (ED) visits increase by 8.4 and 71.3 per 10,000 person-years, respectively, at age 21. These effects are due mainly to an increase in the rate at which young men experience accidental injuries, alcohol overdoses, and injuries inflicted by others. Our results suggest that the literature’s disproportionate focus on mortality leads to a significant underestimation of the benefits of tighter alcohol control.

We assess whether welfare reform affects earnings only through mean impacts that are constant within but vary across subgroups. This is important because researchers interested in treatment effect heterogeneity typically focus on estimating mean impacts that only vary across subgroups. Using a novel approach to simulating treatment group earnings under the constant mean impacts within subgroup model, we find this model does a poor job of capturing treatment effect heterogeneity for Connecticut's Jobs First welfare reform experiment. Notably, ignoring within-group heterogeneitywould lead one to miss evidence that treatment effects are consistent with basic labor supply theory.