Knowledge that Transforms

We discuss Feng et al. (2024), which studies a dynamic model of delegated investment. The paper provides novel insights into the optimal contract between a principal and an agent who obtains private information about both the timing and profitability of investment opportunities. While the analytical analysis provides interesting findings, we have concerns about the validity of the paper’s empirical predictions. We extend the “conceptual” and “operational” levels of Libby boxes by adding an “analytical” level to offer a tool for assessing and developing the link between theoretical models and empirical tests.

We study credit access in informal economies where market institutions, such as financial reporting systems, auditing, and courts, are nonexistent or function poorly. Using the setting of a large bazaar in India, we find that community membership plays a vital role in access to credit. Wholesalers are more likely to provide credit and offer greater amounts of credit to within-community retailers, and are more lenient when these retailers are delinquent. Furthermore, wholesalers who lent preferentially to their community retailers pre-COVID are more likely to receive help from their community following the COVID-19–related income shock, particularly from same-community landlords and suppliers. Also, wholesalers with low endowments, those with greater within-community information flow about them, and those facing income shocks are more likely to provide preferential credit to their community retailers. Our findings are consistent with an indirect reciprocity mechanism explaining within-community credit flows.

Distinguishing between recurring and nonrecurring components of earnings is a critical task in financial analysis and valuation. Academics and quantitative investors often rely on measures of recurring and nonrecurring components derived from standardized financial databases. We use unobserved components modeling and the Kalman smoother to obtain efficient ex-post estimates of the recurring and nonrecurring components of annual earnings. We then show that popular measures are significantly misspecified and that investors appear to anticipate a significant portion of the misspecification. Finally, we identify certain misclassified items that drive misspecification and provide algorithms to improve their ex-ante classification.

We provide the first evidence that prudential principles shape bankers' executive compensation, a phenomenon we call “pay for prudence” (PfP). We conjecture that PfP incentivizes bankers to balance shareholders' preference for risk with regulators' preference for prudence. Although PfP terms are often used in bank compensation contracts, we find that the use of detailed and concrete PfP terms are positively associated with equity incentives for risk-taking. Furthermore, detailed and concrete PfP terms are associated with lower tail risk, fewer bad loans, and lower likelihood of regulatory downgrades. While we do not find evidence that PfP is associated with lower profitability, PfP is associated with more diversified loan portfolios and reduced exposure to real estate. Our results shed light on a new dimension of bankers' pay and suggest that PfP-based incentives complement widely studied equity-based incentives for risk-taking by acting as guard rails that guide managers’ pursuit of investment opportunities.

This study examines the capital-market effects of tipper-tippee insider trading laws. To do so, I exploit the unexpected decision issued by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in U.S. v. Newman 773 F.3d 438, which reduced legal jeopardy for Second Circuit-based market participants prior to being overturned. Consistent with Newman constraining insider trading enforcement, I find strong evidence of plausible insider trading in the Second Circuit following the ruling. I also document a substantial reduction in general trading activity in Second Circuit stocks, as well as an increase in daily quoted spreads and the price impact of trading. These findings are consistent with unchecked insider trading increasing transaction costs and crowding-out investors. In total, my results show that tipper-tippee insider trading restrictions play an important role in bolstering market integrity, and that market participants can to some degree counteract insider trading when public regulation is constrained.

The Securities and Exchange Commission encourages the presentation of information or data in graphical form to improve users' ability to understand financial disclosures. We find a dramatic increase in the disclosure of both qualitative and quantitative infographics in 10-K filings over time and substantial cross-sectional variation in firms' choices regarding image types, data content, and the placement of infographics within 10-Ks. We provide evidence on factors associated with firms’ use of infographics and explore the persistence with which they are disclosed over time. Finally, we investigate the relation between the use of infographics and uncertainty in capital markets.

A CEO's short horizon and associated myopic actions are typically viewed as detrimental to the firm. In contrast, studying a voluntary disclosure model wherein capital market and product market strategic considerations are in play, we show that the CEO's myopic behavior can improve a firm's long-term value. In particular, the disclosures of a long-horizon CEO are seen as being entirely focused on the firm's interests and thus as being exploitative of customers. A short-horizon CEO myopically focused on short-term stock price is less aligned with the firm and, consequently, her disclosures are more customer friendly. As a corollary, when no disclosure is forthcoming, customers are less skeptical that the myopic CEO is withholding information to exploit them. This improves customers' willingness to pay with a myopic CEO, leading to higher firm profitability. The paper also layers in compensation design to derive the optimal degree of managerial short-term focus to induce.

Li, Watts, and Zhu (2024) provide evidence that retail investors trade in response to financially material ESG news. This evidence is consistent with retail investors trading in response to the financial implications of ESG-related information in much the same way that they trade in response to the financial implications of other information. The authors suggest that their evidence is inconsistent with retail investors making investment decisions based on their nonpecuniary preferences. I suggest that their research design is constructed to identify financially motivated trading and is not well suited to drawing inferences about retail investors’ nonpecuniary investment decisions.

We examine the impact of increasing whistleblowing bounties on whistleblowers' strategy and regulatory efficiency in detecting fraud. Our analysis shows the regulator extracts information about the incidence of fraud from whistleblowers' actions, and the quality of such information depends on the size of whistleblowing bounties. With a larger bounty, upon receiving a whistleblowing report, the quality of the regulator's information about fraud deteriorates, whereas upon observing no whistleblowing, the information quality about no fraud improves. Although the informational improvement upon no whistleblowing has not been widely discussed, we demonstrate it is a key determinant of the optimal whistleblowing program. We show, considering the informational value of whistleblowing and no whistleblowing, the regulator should set the bounty to encourage more whistleblowing when the prior belief of fraud is stronger and the insider is better informed. Our analysis generates policy and empirical implications for designing and studying whistleblowing programs.

A signal that identifies asset pricing bubbles would be valuable so investors could reposition their portfolios to weather the bubble, yet ex ante bubble identification has proven illusory. Arif and Sul (2024) study whether industry-level investment in net operating asset (NOA) accruals is an ex ante accounting-based signal that predicts bubbles. Using industry-level price run-ups across 49 countries, they find that NOA accruals predict a higher likelihood of a future crash, lower future returns, and larger analyst forecast errors, especially following run-up periods. The authors attribute these patterns to sentiment-driven overinvestment. My discussion summarizes the contributions of Arif and Sul's findings to the asset pricing bubbles, behavioral finance, and aggregate accruals literatures. I also outline empirical challenges faced by studies investigating bubbles and recommend approaches to further strengthen inferences. Finally, I propose opportunities for future research to integrate deeper accounting knowledge into bubble research.