Wages and Employment in a Random Social Network with Arbitrary Degree Distribution by Yannis M. Ioannides and Adriaan R. Soetevent. Published in volume 96, issue 2, pages 270-274 of American Economic Review, May 2006
Most countries are members of preferential trade agreements (PTAs). The effect of these agreements has attracted much interest and raised the question of whether PTAs promote or slow multilateral trade liberalization, i.e., whether they are a “building block” or “stumbling block” to multilateral liberalization. Despite this long-standing concern with PTAs and the lack of theoretical consensus, there is no systematic evidence on whether they are actually a stumbling block to multilateral liberalization. We use detailed data on U.S. multilateral tariffs to provide the first systematic evidence that the direct effect of PTAs was to generate a stumbling block to its MTL. We also provide evidence of reciprocity in multilateral tariff reductions.
We propose a framework for analyzing transformations of demand. Such transformations frequently stem from changes in the dispersion of consumers' valuations, which lead to rotations of the demand curve. In many settings, profits are a U-shaped function of dispersion. High dispersion is complemented by niche production, and low dispersion is complemented by mass-market supply. We investigate numerous applications, including product design; advertising, marketing and sales advice; and the construction of quality-differentiated product lines. We also suggest a new taxonomy of advertising, distinguishing between hype, which shifts demand, and real information, which rotates demand.
Executive turnover and its link to firm performance can provide a crucial measure of how effectively a firm solves the two sets of principal-agent problems: (a) the diverging interests between top management and shareholders, which may result in managerial entrenchment; and (b) the diverging interests between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, which may lead to the expropriation of the latter by the former or “tunneling,” as referred to in the literature. Tying the personal fortune of top executives to the firm’s performance aligns the interests of shareholders and those of management. It also breaks up the “insider” alliance between the controlling shareholder and management, thereby helping protect the interests of minority shareholders. Although there is a large literature on executive turnover in Western firms, research on executive turnover in non-Western firms is limited, and this paper is the only one on China. A closer look at the executive turnoverperformance link in China (one of the two major internal discipline mechanisms in corporate governance) is particularly relevant, since effective markets for corporate control are missing in China, the largest developing and transitional economy in the world. Furthermore, China is an interesting case because both types of agency problems are acute due to poorly defined property rights and weak investor protection, which result largely from its command economy legacy.
Since the crisis of 1997–1998, there has been a proliferation of proposals for fostering Asian monetary integration. Asian countries, it is suggested, should collectively peg their currencies to the dollar, the yen, or a dollar-yen-euro basket, or establish a multilateral currency grid like the European Monetary System (EMS). The resulting exchange rate stability would promote intraregional trade, simplify investment planning, and encourage cross-border participation in local bond markets. Experience with establishing and maintaining a system of stable exchange rates would help ready the region for the introduction of a single currency. Asia, in this view, should emulate Europe’s approach to regional monetary integration. Along with the attractions of the European example, however, there are also dangers. Defending a system of currency pegs in the presence of high capital mobility requires the close convergence of policies and the maintenance of confidence. If either precondition is disturbed, a country will require extensive financial support in order to defend its peg or to undertake an orderly realignment. In practice, Asian countries possess neither the willingness to subordinate other policies to these imperatives nor the solidarity needed to offer extensive financial supports. Absent an appetite for political integration, there is little readiness to create a regional central bank like the European Central Bank, since there is no counterpart to the European Parliament to hold it accountable for its actions. Hence, there is little prospect of early monetary union to tie down expectations. A system of Asian currency pegs would consequently be fragile and crisis-prone. As a road to monetary unification, it would be a dead end. It would be better for governments to create an Asian Currency Unit (ACU), constituted as a weighted average of Asian currencies, and allow it to circulate alongside their national currencies. This would have three advantages. First, it would not be necessary to stabilize exchange rates between the currencies comprising the basket; hence, fragility would be less. Second, the parallel currency would be more stable than any one national currency in terms of aggregate Asian production and exports; it would, thus, be a vehicle for encouraging intraregional trade and investment. Third, the decision to move to a single currency could be driven by economics rather than politics. Only when a critical mass of producers, exporters, and investors had adopted the parallel currency would it be clear that Asian economies were ready for monetary unification.
Previous experiments using the minimum-effort coordination game reveal a striking regularity—large groups never coordinate efficiently. Given the frequency with which large real-world groups, such as firms, face similarly difficult coordination problems, this poses an important question: Why do we observe large, successfully coordinated groups in the real world when they are so difficult to create in the laboratory? This paper presents one reason. The experiments show that, even though efficient coordination does not occur in groups that start off large, efficiently coordinated large groups can be “grown.” By starting with small groups that find it easier to coordinate, we can add entrants—who are aware of the group's history—to create efficiently coordinated large groups. This represents the first experimental demonstration of large groups tacitly coordinated at high levels of efficiency.
The recent explosion of patenting and patent disputes has sparked a growing literature on the economics of patent litigation. Generally, models in this literature take the existence of a dispute as given. This assumption is troubling because it hampers the interpretation of empirical studies of patent litigation and the assessment of many patent policy reforms. Disputes would not arise if all technology adopters obtained ex ante licenses from patent owners. This suggests that two stories could explain the origin of patent disputes. In one, the technology adopter observes a patented technology, but chooses to imitate, “inventing around” and/or hiding the infringement. In the other, the adopter develops his own technology and is unaware of another firm’s putative patent rights. This kind of innocent infringement occurs because patent rights often have uncertain boundaries or questionable validity. In addition, the sheer number of patents facing a typical innovator makes careful assessment quite burdensome. Furthermore, patent claims are often hidden (sometimes strategically) until after firms have made technology investments. These two accounts suggest that a model of disputes should consider the decisions of patent owners to invent, to patent, and to monitor use of the patented technology by others; and the decisions of potential infringers to monitor extant patents, and develop and adopt new technology. Claude Crampes and Corinne Langinier (2002) endogenize disputes by focusing on a patent owner’s monitoring activity and imitative behavior by potential infringers. Our model includes this behavior, but it also includes defendants who “invent around” a patent, and defendants who are unaware of the patented technology. We find that this richer model generates testable implications that better match empirical evidence on patent litigation.
Labor supply theory predicts systematic heterogeneity in the impact of recent welfare reforms on earnings, transfers, and income. Yet most welfare reform research focuses on mean impacts. We investigate the importance of heterogeneity using random-assignment data from Connecticut's Jobs First waiver, which features key elements of post-1996 welfare programs. Estimated quantile treatment effects exhibit the substantial heterogeneity predicted by labor supply theory. Thus mean impacts miss a great deal. Looking separately at samples of dropouts and other women does not improve the performance of mean impacts. We conclude that welfare reform's effects are likely both more varied and more extensive than has been recognized.
We use earnings forecasts from securities analysts to construct a new measure of the neoclassical fundamentals that drive investment spending. We find that investment responds significantly to our new measure of fundamentals but is insensitive to cash flow, even for firms typically thought to be liquidity constrained. These results have two key implications. First, fundamentals may be more important for investment spending than would be suggested by the results to date from investment-q models. Second, the positive cash-flow effects obtained in such models may reflect a failure to control properly for fundamentals rather than the presence of financial constraints.