Knowledge that Transforms

Researchers typically infer real earnings management when a firm's operating and investing activities differ from industry norms. A significant problem with classifying deviations from industry averages as myopic earnings management is that companies can change their operating and investing decisions for strategic business reasons rather than to mislead stakeholders. Using principal components analysis, we systematically evaluate existing measures and develop a comprehensive real activities measure to better capture earnings manipulation. Our measure reflects (i) deviations from industry averages across multiple activities and (ii) other signals of manipulation. This approach is promising because, although there are many sources of abnormal activities, manipulation is more likely the cause when managers engage in multiple income‐increasing abnormal activities that coincide with other signals that indicate an elevated risk of manipulation. This simple approach results in a metric that associates negatively with future operating performance and earnings persistence, yields high‐power tests, and captures manipulation reasonably well across most life‐cycle stages. Importantly, this approach performs better than the standard real earnings management metrics across all dimensions. Specifically, it generates the expected reduction in future earnings and reduced earnings persistence in 82% of the tests compared to 36% and 46% in common alternatives. Also, because this innovation does not require a long time‐series or rely on future period realizations for classification, it can be useful in more research settings than other recent innovations in the literature.

The rise of stakeholder governance has triggered a wave of legal initiatives to strengthen the employee voice in firms. However, how managers trade off the competing objectives between shareholders and employees when making financial reporting decisions is not well understood. Exploiting staggered employment protection laws (EPLs) across 26 countries, we find that managers facing strong EPLs report more opaque earnings. Exploring the mechanism, we show that EPLs induce manager‐employee alliance: EPLs enhance employees' power to influence managers' private benefits and create an incentive for managers to treat employees more favorably, leading to an increase in manager‐employee reciprocal benefits. Further analysis shows that the alliance drives the increase in opacity following EPLs. Such alliance‐induced opacity impedes the ability of institutional shareholders to make timely adjustments to portfolio holdings in response to EPLs. Last, we identify several governance mechanisms that help break the manager‐employee nexus and restore reporting transparency. Overall, our study documents manager‐employee alliance as a potential cost of rigid labor laws and an important source of managerial reporting bias.

This study examines the interplay between tax and internal reporting incentives among affiliates of multinational corporations (MNCs). MNCs face limited information flows that may prevent affiliates' performance metrics to be responsive immediately to changes in the firm's tax planning. Using granular data of affiliates belonging to MNCs from 21 European countries, our study provides new empirical evidence of affiliate internal reporting responses induced by changing tax plans. When high‐tax‐rate countries tighten income shifting rules, we first document that income shifting is reduced and low‐tax‐rate affiliates have less income. Second, we predict and document that managers of these low‐tax‐rate affiliates offset this decrease in profits by managing upwards a key performance metric: affiliate earnings. Our results are consistent with firms not quickly adjusting the affiliate managers' incentives in the face of changing tax planning strategies, and affiliates managing reported earnings to offset the effect of changes in the tax planning of the firm. Cross‐sectional analyses provide further evidence consistent with the theory underlying the main tests. The results support the policy of tightening income shifting rules when the objective is to reduce income shifting, and firms' central management would benefit from considering the implications of changing tax plans on the assessment of local managers.

We investigate how owners of small‐ and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs) perceive, make sense of, and practice risk management. Drawing on Schatzki's practice theory, we theorize on how and why risk management happens in SMEs. Thus, we fill a gap in the extant literature, which focuses almost exclusively on risk management within large organizations. We interview entrepreneurs and conduct site observations to gain insight into their risk management activities, the drivers that lead to the adoption of said activities, their attitudes toward risk management, and how their accountants may shape and contribute to risk management in SMEs. We find that rather than a specific set of formal processes, entrepreneurs view risk management as a mindset that emphasizes the preservation of key assets, creation of competitive advantages, and development of local talent and expertise. We observe practices that are mainly informal yet planned, deliberate, and fully integrated within the fabric of organizations that align with ideal forms of risk management. We also find that full‐time, in‐house accountants do help entrepreneurs with risk management, while external accountants, whose main activities relate to financial statement preparation and tax filings, do not systematically help entrepreneurs manage risk. We contribute to both the theory and practice of risk management by sharing empirical insights into how SME owners perceive, make sense of, and manage risk.

We examine how regulatory restrictions on capital market activity affect the compensation contracting environment within firms. This study aims to expand our understanding of how financial market development affects firm risk‐taking via management compensation designs. Specifically, taking advantage of the staggered implementation of the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA), which increases bank competition and loan geographical diversification, this study examines how borrowing firms' compensation structures change when banks increase risk tolerance in their loan portfolios. Using hand‐collected compensation data of firms with market capitalization less than $75 million, we hypothesize and find that borrowing firms are likely to increase risk incentives after IBBEA and that this increase is more pronounced for firms located in states with less banking competition in the pre‐IBBEA period. We also show the findings to be more significant for borrowers whose lenders acquire more diversification benefits after IBBEA. These findings suggest that following deregulation, when banks face increased competition as well as an enhanced ability to diversify their credit risk geographically, these same banks tend to increase their tolerance for borrowers' risk‐taking. That is, their clients—nonfinancial firms borrowing from them—adjust their compensation contracts that are previously constrained by bank distaste for risk. We also document that firms that increase their risk incentives the most invest more in R&D, suggesting that management compensation is a complementary channel through which IBBEA affects firm innovation.

This study examines the impact of cross‐firm financial statement comparability on regulatory oversight of accounting quality. Required to review each firm's periodic filings at least once every three years, the SEC learns about the degree to which a firm's accounting system is comparable to those of its peers. We posit that the SEC's ex ante knowledge about financial statement comparability, gleaned from prior‐year filing reviews, facilitates its evaluation of firms' accounting quality during the current‐year filing review. Consistent with the notion that comparable accounting systems enhance regulators' ability to identify discretionary accounting deviations, we find that the likelihood of the SEC issuing a comment letter for higher abnormal accruals increases with financial statement comparability. Further analysis reveals that the regulatory benefits from higher financial statement comparability are more salient when the SEC faces higher monitoring constraints in filing reviews. Moreover, our finding shows that comparable accounting numbers across firms help the SEC detect severe accounting violations that necessitate restatements. Overall, we provide novel evidence suggesting that higher financial statement comparability improves the efficacy of the SEC's oversight of accounting quality by reducing the information costs associated with cross‐firm comparisons.

This study examines whether auditors' evaluation and reporting of firms' internal control over financial reporting (ICFR) affects firm operational efficiency. Prior research indicates that the strength of internal controls is positively associated with economic benefits. However, notwithstanding the underlying strength of controls, whether the mere presence of an ICFR audit provides similar economic benefits is unclear. We predict and find that small firms with ICFR audits have significantly higher overall operational efficiency than small firms with only management ICFR reports, even after controlling for underlying internal control strength. We find this effect manifests through improvements in inventory turnover and innovation, and through increased relative product market share. Separately, we find ICFR audits are associated with lower efficiency in SG&A expenses. Cross‐sectional analyses indicate that the mechanism by which ICFR audits affect overall operational efficiency is through auditor detection of internal control problems and through knowledge spillover from auditing other highly efficient firms in the audit office's metropolitan statistical area. These results provide additional evidence on the ongoing cost and benefit debate of ICFR audits for small firms.

We present evidence on the effects of target firms' accounting conservatism in a merger and acquisition transaction. Conservatism is distinct from other accounting or accrual quality constructs examined in prior work. Its unique features can lead to potential benefits for both the targets and the acquirers. The use of conservatism by targets reduces acquirers' risks of acquiring underperforming assets or overpaying for well‐performing assets. In addition, targets' conservatism results in greater production of verifiable information that can help the acquirers better estimate and realize synergies of the combined firm. Consistent with these arguments, we find that firms with greater accounting conservatism are more likely to receive a bid. We also find that targets' conservatism increases the deal premium and the announcement returns of both the targets and the acquirers, respectively. Overall, these results indicate that conservatism provides benefits to both sellers and buyers of equity in an acquisition transaction.

This study examines the role of information transparency in facilitating peer firms' investment in follow‐on innovation. We capture information transparency with both textual and numerical information disclosed in 10‐Ks. Using patent citations to proxy for investment in follow‐on innovation, we predict and find a positive association between transparency at the knowledge source and follow‐on innovation. We further show that the effect of information transparency varies with the degree of uncertainty around technological innovation. Thus, the evidence suggests that information transparency facilitates investment in follow‐on innovation by resolving uncertainty associated with investment in technological innovation. An analysis using the cited firms' going‐private decision as a negative shock to information transparency confirms the significant effect of a cited firm's disclosure on its decision to invest in follow‐on innovation. Our study contributes to the literature on the positive externalities of peer‐firm disclosures and highlights the important role of information transparency in shaping innovation investment decisions.

Stock exchanges are important intermediaries in how firm information enters price. Trading halts are a key tool, often exercised at the exchanges' discretion, to prevent extraordinary price volatility when new information arrives. We investigate how exchanges use discretion and whether the discretion alters the effectiveness of the halts. We provide evidence consistent with halts reflecting the preferences of listed firms rather than the stated exchange objectives (i.e., minimizing excess volatility and off‐equilibrium trades). Furthermore, when exchanges exercise more discretion (unexplained by firm and information characteristics), the halts are less effective. Specifically, halts with more discretion are less likely to resume trading with efficient prices and are more likely to have been called unnecessarily (i.e., little to no price movement during the halt). These findings are consistent with exchanges using halts to cater to listed firms rather than to meet exchange objectives such as minimizing excess volatility or avoiding trades at off‐equilibrium prices.