School officials and legislators have long been concerned with the possibility of declining teacher quality (see e.g., Sean Corcoran et al., 2002). Beginning in the 1960's, states began testing prospective teachers in a direct effort to ensure that teachers meet minimum standards for basic skills and subject knowledge. By 1999, 41 states required applicants to pass some sort of standardized certification test. As a theoretical matter, however, the impact of such testing is ambiguous. Test requirements may establish a minimum achievement standard, as their proponents hope. On the other hand, testing and other certification requirements may deter some qualified applicants from teaching if these requirements are perceived as costly. This is the barriers-to-entry story first noted in the occupational licensing context by Milton F. Friedman and Simon Kuznets (1945). Another concern with job applicant testing is the possibility of an adverse impact on minority candidates, who usually do worse on tests (see David Autor and David Scarborough [2003] for a recent study). Paralleling increased state involvement in teacher certification is the increase in teachers' educational credentials, especially in public schools. For example, in 1971, over two-thirds of public-school teachers had a B.A., while only 27 percent had a master's or education specialist's degree. By 1991, however, over half of public school teachers (52.6 percent) had a master's or education specialist's degree. In contrast, the proportion of private-school teachers
Since Gary Becker’s (1964) seminal work, the theoretical and empirical literature on human capital has focused almost exclusively on general-purpose and firm-specific human capital. In this paper we discuss the implications of a third type of human capital, which we call task-specific, and which we believe is potentially as commonplace and as important as the two classic types. By task-specific human capital we mean that some of the human capital an individual acquires on the job is specific to the tasks being performed, as opposed to being specific to the firm. In other words, task-specific human capital is the simple but plausible idea that much of the human capital accumulated on the job is due to task-specific learning by doing. The idea of task-specific human capital is closely related to occupationand industryspecific human capital. In each case, human capital is specific to the nature of the work, not specific to the firm. Hence, when capital is accumulated, multiple firms value the capital, so most (or even all) of the value of the capital will be reflected in the worker’s wage. The main difference between the idea of task-specific human capital and occupationand industryspecific human capital is in how the idea is applied. We argue that task-specific human capital has much wider applicability than suggested (so far) by the occupationand industry-specific human-capital literatures; the specific issues we address are cohort effects, job design, and promotions. Another argument in the literature closely related to ours is the classic argument of Adam Smith (1776) in the Wealth of Nations concerning returns to specialization. Smith’s argument was that, due to learning-by-doing at the level of the task, productivity can be enhanced by having each job entail fewer tasks. We believe that Smith was correct in focusing on learningby-doing at the level of the task as an important idea for thinking about organizations. The goal of our paper is to describe some of the other implications of this idea for the design and operation of organizations.
This paper utilizes a plausibly exogenous source of variation in housing assistance generated by public housing demolitions in Chicago to examine the impact of high-rise public housing on student outcomes. I find that children in households affected by the demolitions do no better or worse than their peers on a wide variety of achievement measures. Because the majority of households that leave high-rise public housing in response to the demolitions move to neighborhoods and schools that closely resemble those they left, the zero effect of the demolitions may be interpreted as the independent impact of public housing.
Can monetary policy committees, accustomed to describing their plans and actions in terms of the level of a short-term nominal interest rate, find effective means of conducting and communicating their policies when that rate is zero or close to zero? The very low levels of interest rates in Japan, Switzerland, and the United States in recent years have stimulated much interesting research on this question and have led some central banks to make changes in their operating procedures and communications strategies. In this paper, we will give a brief overview of current thinking on the conduct of monetary policy when short-term interest rates are very low or even zero. Monetary policy works for the most part by influencing the prices and yields of financial assets, which in turn affect economic decisions and thus the evolution of the economy. When the short-term policy rate is at or near zero, the conventional means of effecting monetary ease (lowering the target for the policy rate) is no longer feasible. However, it would be a mistake to think that monetary policy was impotent. We discuss three strategies for stimulating the economy at an unchanged level of the policy rate: these involve (i) providing assurance to investors that short rates will be kept lower in the future than they currently expect, (ii) changing the relative supplies of securities in the marketplace by altering the composition of the central bank’s balance sheet, and (iii) increasing the size of the central bank’s balance sheet beyond the level needed to set the short-term policy rate at zero (“quantitative easing”). We also discuss the costs and benefits of very low interest rates, an issue that bears on the question of whether the central bank should take the policy rate all the way to zero before undertaking alternative policies.
We study the incentives that governments have to protect intellectual property in a trading world economy. We consider a world economy with ongoing innovation in two countries that differ in market size and in their capacity for innovation. After describing the determination of national patent policies in a noncooperative regime of patent protection, we ask, “Why is intellectual property better protected in the North than in the South?” We also study international patent agreements by deriving the properties of an efficient global regime of patent protection and asking whether harmonization of patent policies is necessary or sufficient for global efficiency.
Economists since John Richard Hicks have known that one of the principal means, if not the principal means, through which countries benefit from international trade is by the expansion of varieties. The seminal work of Paul R. Krugman (1979) brought the study of varieties into sharp focus by presenting a simple generalequilibrium model in which countries gain from trade through the import of new varieties. Since then, economists have been hampered in their ability to quantify the impact of new varieties on national welfare by the econometric and data hurdles that need to be surmounted. In this paper, we document some stylized facts about the growth in global varieties which suggest that there may have been substantial welfare gains through the import of new varieties. Moreover, we calculate the impact of increased variety on import prices and find that conventional measures of import price inflation may be dramatically biased upward. Classical international-trade theory postulates that the elimination of trade barriers improves welfare by reducing the wedge between domestic and import prices as well as the ensuing deadweight loss. An entirely different reason for the gains from trade arises from models of monopolistic competition. If consumers value variety and countries cannot produce all varieties due to a fixed cost in the production of each variety, countries stand to gain from trade because it expands the set of available varieties. In these models, the gains hinge crucially on a number of parameters and variables. The first is the elasticity of substitution among varieties. If varieties are highly substitutable, as might be true for varieties of gasoline, then increasing the number of varieties is unlikely to have much of an effect on prices and welfare. Second, quality variation across varieties may matter. Presumably, most Americans care more about having access to French red wine than to Japanese red wine. Finally, import quantities matter as, ceteris paribus, one cares more about variety growth in big sectors than in small sectors. In Broda and Weinstein (2004), we carefully estimate the impact of increased variety in the United States over the period from 1972 to 2001. Using the most disaggregated import data available, we document that the number of varieties imported by the United States, defined as the number of import categories multiplied by the average number of source countries for each category, quadrupled. About half of this increase was due to increases in the number of categories and half due to a doubling of the number of countries from which the United States imported each good. Measuring the impact of this increase on U.S. import prices and welfare is a complex process that we will only discuss briefly here. Essentially, we used Robert C. Feenstra’s (1994) methodology to estimate 30,000 elasticities and then construct an aggregate price index that is robust to common changes in quality variation, the arbitrary splitting of categories, the introduction of new goods, and a host of other data problems. After reconstructing the U.S. import price index, we found that the price of U.S. imports has been falling at a rate 1.2 percent per year faster than one would have thought without taking new varieties into account. To get some sense of the enormity of this bias, consider that the impact of quality adjustments on the consumer price index is estimated to be 0.6 percent per year. Using this adjusted import price index, we estimate the impact of new imported varieties on * Broda: Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 33 Liberty Street, New York, NY 10045; Weinstein: Economics Department, Columbia University, 420 W. 118th Street, New York, NY 10027, and NBER. We thank Joshua Greenfield for excellent research assistance. We thank Robert Feenstra and Peter Klenow for excellent comments. 1 “The extension of trade does not primarily imply more goods ... the variety of goods available is (also) increased, with all the widening of life that that entails. There can be little doubt that the main advantage that will accrue to those with whom our merchants are trading is a gain of precisely this kind ... . This is a gain which ‘quantitative economic history,’ which works with index numbers of real income, is ill-fitted to measure, or even to describe” (Hicks, 1969 p. 56).
In this paper I use a panel data set to investigate the mechanics of sudden stops of capital inflows and current account reversals. I am particularly interested in four questions: (a) What is the relationship between sudden stops and current account reversals? (b) To what extent does financial openness affect the probability of a country being subject to a current account reversal? In other words, do restrictions on capital mobility reduce the probability of such occurrences? (C) Does openness -- both trade openness and financial openness -- play a role in determining the effect of current account reversals on economic performance (i.e. GDP growth)? And, (d) does the exchange rate regime affect the intensity with which reversals affect real activity? The empirical analysis shows that sudden stops and current account reversals have been closely related. The econometric analysis suggests that restricting capital mobility does not reduce the probability of experiencing a reversal. Current account reversals, in turn, have had a negative effect on real growth that goes beyond their direct effect on investment. The regression analysis indicates that the negative effects of current account reversals on growth will depend on the country's degree of trade openness: More open countries will suffer less in terms of lower growth relative to trend than countries with a lower degree of trade openness. On the other hand, the degree of financial openness does not appear to be related to the intensity with which reversals affect real economic performance. The empirical analysis also suggests that countries with more flexible exchange rate regimes are able to accommodate better shocks stemming from a reversal than countries with more rigid exchange rate regimes.